Generous Questions Episode 1: Jonathan Webber Joe introduces the episode. Transcription begins 02m02s Joe: So, how would you introduce yourself if you were introducing yourself in this context? JW: I would say, 'My name's Jonathan Webber and I'm a professor of philosophy at Cardiff University.’ Joe: Great, thanks. That sounds right. You have just written a book, Rethinking Existentialism, and that's coming out in July 2018. JW: That's right. It is indeed. I know that because I've seen the proof. Joe: Well, that's good. Yeah. Did you pick the cover art? JW: Yes. Well, hopefully, because it's still not entirely decided yet, but it's probably going to be a painting by a friend of mine.   Joe: Oh, that's nice. JW: He supplied a couple of paintings and I ran a little poll on Twitter and Facebook and also the people at Oxford University Press--they decided which one they preferred and the vote was pretty evenly-split, but everyone was pretty clear on which one overall Joe: You've got a previous book, which is The Imaginaire. JW: The Imaginaire. Joe: There your choices for cover art tend to be just blue skies with clouds. Is that right? JW: That was nothing to do with me. Joe: Right, okay. JW: No, that was--yeah, I didn't get a say in the cover art of that and it was only when it came out that somebody pointed out that it looked very similar to the cover of Imagine, John Lennon's album. Joe: Oh, nice. JW: ...which was also sort of green and cloudy. But that's been reissued. It now has a pot of paint on the cover. Joe: Good. That makes sense. JW: It looks great. But that's not really my book. It's one of Sartre's books. Joe: Of course, and this is a translation that you did. JW: ...and I translated it. Yeah. Joe: Good. So in the new book--obviously you're still working on Sartre; he's obviously a big part of this--but as I understand it, the book mostly wants to side with Simone de Beauvoir, wants to, sort of, find a core of existentialism, something that really defines existentialism and finds a defence for it that seems to best be articulated by Simone de Beauvoir and not by Jean Paul Sartre. Is that right?  JW: That is right, yeah, and that wasn't what I set out to do, but that's sort of what came out of the research doing it. I just wanted to look at the differences between Sartre and Beauvoir in the 1940s and look at the ways in which their works, sort of, developed over that decade. Joe: Good, so they're both quintessential existentialists. One of the things that you do in the book is try to tell us what it is to be an existentialist. That might be a joke in some circles, the idea that there's a sort of essence to existentialism, but do you want to tell us, in a nutshell, what you think that is? So, what is an existentialist according to you? JW: According to me, an existentialist is a philosopher who agrees with the ideas that Sartre and Beauvoir publicised in the autumn of 1945 in a campaign of articles and interviews and public talks that they called The Existentialist Defensive. The reason why that's definitive of existentialism is it is the first time the word was ever given a clear definition. The word was only coined, sort of, shortly before that anyway. That is the view when Sartre summarises it in a slogan that 'existence precedes essence'. That is, that individual people, an individual person, doesn't have any kind of in-built personality structure or essential characteristics that explain why they do the things they do, that explain the tastes they have, the desires they have, and so on and so forth. Rather, all of these, kind of, aspects of character are dependent on the projects that the person is pursuing, the ways they're going about living their lives. Joe: Good. Okay, so the slogan is 'existence precedes essence'. So, first of all, the person or the subject is...they find that they exist, so they're aware. They have some sort of consciousness and that's the first and perhaps the only thing that we can agree on about a subject and everything after that is up for grabs. Is that the idea, that there's nothing to their essence? There's nothing that they have to be doing or have to, sort of, find themselves--I guess the claim would be, sort of, innately doing? Yes, that's right, so there's nothing that's fixed. Joe: Okay, nothing's fixed. JW: ...I think is a better way of thinking about it. Yep, that's right, so anything that seems to be, like, the particular tastes they have, or the desires they have or the ways in which they characteristically go about things, those are all products of their outlook on life which Sartre describes as a kind of project. Better translation of that, I think, into English is, sort of, 'undertakings', 'commitments’. Joe: Okay. So that claim, the core claim of existentialism there, that existence precedes essence...I can see that as being a denial of there being something like a grand claim about human nature explaining why people do the things they do. So if you have any kind of theory that the reason why people do things is because of Human Nature, putting those with, kind of, capitals around them, existentialism is a kind of denial of that. It says you don't do things because of some sort of in-born human nature, you do it because of some other thing. And here we get Sartre saying it's because of projects or undertakings that you've come along and, I guess, chosen to some extent. JW: Yeah, that's exactly right. So any theory, for example, that says that people behave the way they do because people are inherently altruistic or because people are inherently selfish or anything like that, existentialism just rejects any such claim because there is, as you say, no kind of inherent, fixed, innate human nature on their view. And it goes further than that. That's, kind of, on the grand scale, the human scale, but of course it's true of groups of people too. So there's no such thing as a, kind of, fixed gender. There's no such thing as, kind of, fixed racial or ethnic characteristics either. Joe: Okay and does it go even further? So there's no human nature, there's no thing that all humans are doing qua human, or because they're humans or because of their humanity. There's nothing they're doing to be explained by their race or by their gender. Does it also go as far as their character? So something like their personality. Do people lack characters or personalities as well? JW: So I think that’s not their view. Their view is that people do have characters, individual characters, and often, they'll be commonalities within the group of people. Commonalities in that character. So it's not the denial that there are any such things as, kind of, masculine traits or feminine traits, for example. It's just the claim that those are not fixed essential features of any individual. They're rather characteristics that individuals have as a result of the projects that they undertake, and that people in the same social position are likely to undertake similar projects in similar ways. That's why you then, emerging from that, will get sort of similar or you might get similar tastes or desires or aims among groups of people. Joe: Yeah. So when we think about why people do what they do--if our task is something like trying to explain people's behaviour or their actions--one thing that we think that they're doing, which is a mistake, is if they explain their behaviours, because if they explain their behaviours by reverting to some claims about their humanity or about their gender or about their class or about some other feature. If they say, 'Oh, I'm just doing that because all humans are selfish,' or 'I'm just doing that because that's what men do. I'm just being a man.' If they're using those as explanations, they're making some kind of mistake. It might well be true that, for example, lots of men behave in certain ways. There might be a kind of gendered way of acting that we can recognise and that maybe we pick up and adopt--maybe unreflectively, maybe we choose to be more like other men--but the idea is that if someone is trying to explain or, I guess, justify their behaviour by appealing to those features, they're justifying or explaining their behaviour by saying, 'It just follows from some fixed part of me,' and the insight of existentialism is to say, 'Those things aren't fixed. You can walk away from those. You don't have to act the way you do. You don't have to fall in line with those parts of who you are or what you are.' Is that right? JW: That is right, yes, but what I think is that Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir had different views on the degree to which how that can happen at the time of The Existentialist Defensive in 1945. So although they both agreed that existence precedes essence and they both agreed with everything you've just said, Sartre famously has this view which he calls 'radical freedom', which is that everything just depends on the projects or undertakings or commitments that you have, and you can just abandon those commitments, or any one of them. Although it may be that you can't simply abandon one because it's, kind of, bound up with other ones in complicated ways. It may be that it actually requires quite a transformation of your life to abandon, sort of, deeply held commitments, but nevertheless you can do that. Because they're not fixed parts of your personality, not innate or essential to you.  Simone de Beauvoir has, I think, a slightly different view, which is that the projects that you undertake become gradually sedimented or habituated into your character. Projects that you'd been working on or undertaking for years, or commitments that you've had for years will be ones that are quite difficult for you to overcome. You can choose to, as you say, walk away from them, but they're not just going to disappear overnight. You're going to need to develop new habits in their place. You're going to find that those old commitments and old ideas still somehow seep out in your behaviour or in your desires or in your tastes even if you abandoned them years ago. I think this is essential to her novel, She Came to Stay--L'Invitée--in 1943, which is the same year Sartre published Being and Nothingness, which is his theory of radical freedom. But I think it's most clearly articulated in The Second Sex in 1949. Joe: Okay, so on the view of freedom that you get in Sartre, this radical freedom, it sounds like you can--once you've recognised that you've adopted some sorts of projects and those things are starting to perhaps define the way that you act or give rise to the way you act. Once you've recognised that that's something that you chose, or that is actually up for grabs, and is possibly something you can choose to reject or walk away from, his conception is then something like, so now you need to freely choose some other way to be, and that should be relatively straightforward once you recognise that all you really have is existence and that there isn't any essence. You should be able to, kind of, pick up or drop these things. And de Beauvoir says, 'In principle that sounds okay but it's just going to be a bit more drawn out and slower than that.' There's going to be some sort of--I think the word that you used was 'inertia'. There's going to be some sort of time lag. Is that the only difference? It's just about how long these things take? JW: Yes, but I think that makes a very substantial difference in their theory, because it's a difference right at the core of the theory about what it is for existence to precede to essence. So on Sartre's view, your projects or commitments, they have no inertia of their own. They're only there insofar as you are committed to them and if you stop being committed to them, that's it. They're not your commitments anymore. Whereas on Beauvoir's view, no--they increase in inertia, in their own inertia, in their own kind of weight, in their own significance, the longer you continue to endorse them. They become more difficult to overthrow. Maybe an example would help to make this clearer, right? So, in The Second Sex, she gives a detailed account of how femininity as a gender comes about, she thinks, through childhood, through upbringing, through the clothes that girls wear and the toys they play with and the stories that they're told and the games they're allowed to play and so on and so forth. And she says, you know, that's what generates a kind of outlook which is relatively common among women, she thinks, because they've had this common upbringing and they've behaved in similar ways. They've undertaken similar projects and those projects have gained in inertia and shaped the way they see the world. Even if, as an adult, you try to overthrow all that and decide that actually that this is a, kind of, invisible prison, then it's not simply that you can just walk away from it. What you find is that although you officially have abandoned it, you find that it still does in some ways shape the way you see the world, shape the decisions you make, shape your tastes and so on. And I take it that's a kind of an autobiographical point that she's making there. I take it that's a phenomenological point about what it is to be relatively liberated western woman in the 1940s in Paris, with her upbringing and her current thinking. Joe: When you say that's actually not just a time lag, and it's not just a--so, part of the story is, it's not as easy, perhaps, as radical freedom suggests it should be, to shake something off. That comes with costs, because you've invested, in many ways, in a way of being, or a project. I guess it's not just that it's come at a cost but you have, in some sense, invested some value in that thing. And is the claim, then, that somehow this thing continues to have some sort of value for you even when you've decided that you want to abandon it, that it somehow-- JW: That's right. Joe: It sustains its value despite the fact that you, maybe, no longer claim to value it. Is that the idea? JW: That is, yes. That's exactly right. But it's also not just about value because what comes with the value is a kind of way of seeing the world. What comes with the value of certain types of behaviour, feminine behaviour, that you might value because you've had this particular upbringing is also seeing that as kind of natural. Seeing it as just what women are like, and seeing men as different in certain ways as though that's part of their nature too. That's all bound up in the value system. So that understanding of what people are like, even if you might then reflectively reject it and you've explicitly and deliberatively thought about it conceptually, you know, you've done a lot of research, you've done a lot of reading. You've decided that actually, you don't believe in that stuff anymore. Nevertheless, on some level, you, kind of, still are committed to it, and it does shape the way you see things and the way you do things. Joe: So then the next question is if you've got these two conceptions of freedom, I mean, they're both talking about freedom--I don't know what you would think about phrasing those conceptions of freedom in terms of those, sort of, contemporary debates or the 20th-century debate generally in analytic philosophy about freedom when people think about freedom of the will, whether these people are talking about freedom of the will in a way that's at all dove-tailing or matching with some of the debates about determinism and freedom of choice and those kinds of things. Is there a sense where we can say Sartre, Beauvoir and these people, when they're talking about freedom, mean something the same as freedom talked about in those sort of discussions about freedom of the will, and determinism and those sort of areas?    JW: I think that one of the things that drove Sartre to his view of radical freedom in the early--in 1943, in 1945--is that he did want to be addressing that issue of free will and determinism too, and he wanted to articulate a theory of freedom that was incompatible with determinism. Joe: Good, okay. JW: So in terms of those debates, he's a classic libertarian incompatibilist about freedom. I don't think that anything really substantial in his existentialism actually requires that. Joe: Okay. JW: I don't think it rests on it. So as a result, he doesn’t need it. I think Simone de Beauvoir wasn't interested in that debate, and I think that's perhaps part of the backstory of why she wasn't attracted to this idea of radical freedom--with which she could see a lot of problems. Even though he was. Yeah. Joe: The kind of problems that she sees there are problems which in some sense are supposed to describe why it's so hard to be an existentialist on Sartre's conception of existentialism. What I mean by 'hard' is something like 'painful', the way he expresses is just something like, once you've understood this key insight of existentialism, the idea of it, you have no fixed or determined essence. You just have your existence, and then you have a number of undertakings or projects that you can, with your radical freedom, just choose between and pick the ones that, I guess, seem to be the ones that are important to you at the time that you decide to value them. She recognises that it's not as easy as that and wants to point out why what he's conceived as radical freedom is actually quite hard for individuals to do. I mean, is that what she's trying to do? To explain why actually what he's giving as a, kind of, description of existentialism turns out to be very painful or causes quite a lot of anguish or, sort of, dissonance?  JW: Yeah, that's an interesting perspective on it. Yeah, I think that's exactly what she's trying to do. And in fact, I think that's exactly what she does do in the novel She Came to Stay that's, as I said, published in 1943. I mean, at the centre at that novel is a relationship between two characters, Pierre and Françoise, who are very transparently modelled on Sartre and Beauvoir— Joe: Okay. [laughter] JW: [laughter] --and what goes on in the story, I think, they've been working together, they're a couple where they've also, sort of, been living a life where they've both committed to their shared artistic projects. Then it comes about that Pierre doesn't seem to be that committed to it after all and perhaps is quite open to the idea that they've been wasting their time and they should just do something else. And Françoise finds this to be--this causes in Françoise a, kind of, massive, classic existentialist crisis and breakdown. I think what that dramatises is--I think what's going on there, is that in Beauvoir's view, Françoise really was committed their project all this time, and pursuing it all this time, and that's why it has become so deeply sedimented in her outlook, that the idea that the project is going to break is earth-shattering. I mean, that tears her world apart. It doesn't tear Pierre's world apart at all, and what that evidences is, is that he wasn't that committed to it all along because otherwise it would have been more deeply sedimented in his outlook. I think that's what she's up to there. Joe: So part of this is diagnosing--I don't know whether 'diagnosing' is the right word, but something like, trying to capture not just what it is to be a human agent--so in that sense, the existentialist project is describing or giving an analysis or an understanding of what human existence is like. JW: Yeah. Joe: But here we find some emphasis coming through in de Beauvoir of something like not just, should we say, the metaphysical condition that humans are in, but also something about the emotional and psychological experience of being a human.   JW: Yes. Joe: And that seems to be something that she wants to emphasise much more. I mean, I take it that some of that stuff is present in Sartre? I mean, these people had this understanding of phenomenology generally, right? That was something that was in the water, right-- JW: Hmm. Joe: --that these guys are occupied by what it's like to be a human subject, or to be a subject or an agent. JW: Yeah. Joe: But she seems to want to place more emphasis on this--I don't want to say 'sentimental', but these, sort of, psychological features. JW: Hm. No, I mean, so, Sartre does too to some extent. He's got a theory of emotions and a, kind of, broader theory of feelings, of affectivity, and he wants to say that those are expressions of the projects that you're pursuing in the world which, to some extent, offers some resistance to what it is that you're trying to do and sometimes, that resistance can't be overcome. It's rather--the difference, really, is, that I think Beauvoir thinks that you can't explain the phenomenology of feelings in that way. If you think they just rest on commitments, which have no inertia of their own and that you can simply give up-- Joe: Yeah. JW: --I think she thinks that the phenomenology can only be explained if commitments become sedimented into your character and become a, kind of, deeply held, weighty part of the construction of who you are. Joe: So to hold something as valuable is really to invest in it in some slightly more substantial sense than just to treat it as valuable at the moment. JW: Yes, exactly, and that's why--so, I think that what she thinks commitment to something is, to be committed to something and to act on it is to be committed to it becoming part of who you are. Joe: Hm. JW: Rather than just be committed to it for the moment, yeah. Joe: And at the same time, that commitment is, in some sense, provisional?  So if you've recognised the sort of core truth of existentialism, which is that these are, in some sense, merely undertakings--they are undertakings and they gather a certain amount of inertia, but nevertheless, they're not your essence. They don't define you. They're just projects that you're--I say 'just' and 'merely'--but I mean, they're things that you're currently doing and that you might stop doing. You might revise. They're not fixed so they are abandonable in the future. So while you're going to be committed to them and invest in them with a policy or a hope that you're going to continue doing so for a long time, you're also going to recognise that that's revisable, that you're quite likely to revise them in the future. JW: Yes. I mean, that's right. Again, I think that's part of what it is to be a commitment, right? It's something that you continue to be committed to and if you change your mind, you come up with reasons that you want to revise that commitment and commit yourself to something incompatible with it, then you can do so. But to do so isn't simply as it is on Sartre's view to just, sort of, throw the old thing away and start with something new. The old thing doesn't just disappear because you've been committed to it for so long. It takes a long time to overcome it and start doing...for your new commitments to end up with the inertia that the old commitments had. Joe: Yeah. JW: Yeah. Joe: Here's a question that you tackle in the book but, I guess, people ask quite a lot about existentialism. It’s 'Does this mean that I'm free to choose anything? If I'm unconstrained by human nature, if I'm unconstrained, or if there isn't a fixity to the things that I'm going to do or value or be, does that mean that I'm free to do anything?' I mean, in one sense you might think, 'Let's just not worry about what philosophers say about this.' Most people are, in the weak sense of 'freedom', free to do anything, insofar as if you want to go rob a bank, you could make that your undertaking. Whether it's a good idea or whether it's a moral idea or whether it's a thing that's worth doing, we can leave that question out of it. Of course that's an undertaking you can take on. I guess the question that people ask in this context of existentialism is, it looks like with Sartre's radical freedom and even under Beauvoir's view of the idea that you could slowly turn the boat around and change not just your preferences but which direction you want to head in, you can change those things. These things aren't fixed. Does that mean that anything's up for grabs? That you could--I take it there are going to be some limits on it. This is the reason I ask. There are going to be limits on the things that you can, should we say, adopt as an undertaking. JW: Well, there are limits--I mean, so, there are limits set by your physical capabilities. Joe: Yep. JW: Right? And there are limits set by your social context. So your example of robbing a bank, right? I mean, so, you can only do that because there are banks. Joe: Yep. JW: Because there is an institution of private property, right? And you can't do it anymore anyway, because banks don't really trade in things that you can pick up and walk out with. So yeah, in that sense, both your social and physical context circumscribe your possibilities. Joe: Okay. I guess I was thinking that there are, sort of, examples that come up, like--actually, I’m aware that there are a lot of existentialist novels --when we think about existentialists, we quite often talk about novels and plays. Because I was going to give an example from a play--from a novel. Maybe that's a question as well. Why do you think that is? Why do we find novels playing such a large role in the way that we hear about existentialism or the way that it gets broadcast? Like you said, there's a, sort of, period of manifesto of existentialist thought coming about in the '40s, but--like you said, there's also coming out in books and in plays, right? This is coming out in novels and plays, not just, you know, manuscripts. What is the link there? JW: I think there is a conceptual link between existentialist and a literary fiction and literary drama because they are offering a theory of what it is to be a human being and to be a human individual. It lends itself very clearly to, kind of, illustration and examples, but examples that are extended and very detailed examples. That's essentially what the classic existentialist literary works, I think, are. I think there's also other reasons too. One of that--so, Simone de Beauvoir thinks that literature is just a better expression of your metaphysical outlook than philosophical theorising can be. At least at one point in her career, in 1945, in a lecture called Literature and Metaphysics. What she means by that is that philosophy is a way of trying to delineate a particular conceptual architecture that captures your understanding of the way life works and the way the world works, whereas literature just, kind of, dramatises it and illustrates it, and is able to capture a lot more detail and a lot more nuance and bring it to life in a way that conceptual articulation doesn't. I mean, she might be wrong about that, but that's her view and that's why her first, I think, clear statement of existentialism comes in a novel. Throughout her life she's publishing short stories, and also the biography on autobiographies, which are not as historically accurate as they might seem to be. Joe: They're literary biographies, right. JW: But they are rather--yes, she's rather free and easy with the truth, it turns out, in some of those books. But that's kind of fine too because I don't think what she was really trying to do was tell you the story of her life, but rather, to do the same thing that she was doing in novels and in her--she did write one play--which is to present these dramatisations of the human condition. Sartre, on the other hand, Sartre just wanted to excel at everything. (laughter) He wanted to be the new Proust, he wanted to be the new Freud, he wanted to be the new Socrates-- Joe: Right. JW: --he wanted to be the new Kant. Joe: You have to do a bit of everything. JW: Yeah. Joe: Yeah. So I guess the thing I was thinking of was the sort of scandalous, erotic story or novel, The Story of O, where the protagonist is someone who seems to--is induced into a, kind of, a world of--I guess we'll call it BDSM now, although I don't think that's how it frames itself at the time. But there we get a character who seems to choose--with some inertia, but comes round to what we could call a lifestyle, or we could call an existence--chooses to give up--maybe this isn't quite the right way to frame it--but chooses to give up her free will, or something like that. She seems to suggest that her will can now be dictated by another person, so she--it's not clear whether we should say she 'elects' to give up her free will--but comes round to the idea that really the thing that she wants most in the world is for someone else to make her choices for her. JW: Right. Joe: That looks like, on the one hand, someone exercising their ability to choose. We've got a character who realises, unconstrained by her essence, there's nothing fixed that she should or shouldn't be doing. And in particular in this context, what she's doing is, you know, fairly extreme, sort of, sexually deviant behaviour as it was considered at the time. And so, unconstrained by the taboos of her society and those kinds of things, realises, 'I'm gonna do all these kinds of things. I'm not constrained by my human nature or by some sort of moral nature that's supposed to be predicated of all of us.' Yet one of the things that she does seem to choose, apparently, is to give up her free will, to let someone else make choices for her, to abandon something like her agency. That seems to be something that, I guess--I don't know whether it's logically coherent at all. It might be that there's a kind of paradox there or a contradiction, choosing not to choose. But it seems to at least be something that could be presented to both Sartre's idea of radical freedom but also de Beauvoir's, because there is a kind of inertia in The Story of O, where these are people--or this is a person who chooses not to choose. I wonder whether that's an example of something where constraint--is there a part of our human nature, shall we say, that we can't escape from, and that is our choosings of things? 
JW: Good, thanks. Yeah, that's a really interesting example. The Sartre of 1943 and 1945 would say, 'Well, that's exactly--what you just say there's exactly right.' Although you can choose not to choose--although that's what O does, she's still choosing it. She's continually committed to that, and underwriting that commitment, and can just abandon it at any time. Because that's the structure of what it is to be human, right? So you can't abandon that while you're still alive. Joe: But when you say that the thought is, the structure of what it is to be human isn't the same as saying there's some sort of 'human nature'.  JW: Yeah, no. Right. Joe: Okay. JW: So the idea of human nature would be that there are particular kinds of motivations that people have--particularly goals or values or something which are innate or fixed or something like that. Obviously, there are--you know, there's a structure of what it is to be human. The way in which we live our lives is not the way in which cats and dogs live their lives. We don't exist in the way that trees and rocks exist, right? So there's a structure of what it is to exist like a human being, like one of us, like a rational agent, really. And so Sartre's view is that that requires that you continually choose your outlook and, kind of, underwrite it--underwrite your commitment to seeing the world this way. What O is doing on that view is that the one thing that she's choosing, continually choosing, is that she doesn't choose anything else. Right? Joe: But nevertheless, she's making that choice regularly. JW: But she's making that choice regularly and she continues to be committed to it. But on Beauvoir's view of sedimentation, I mean, well, she would still agree with what I've just said. It's more complicated, because the more O does that--I don't know the story--but you said there's a kind of inertia. She has to overcome the inertia and really take this on as her character and her second nature. But then once she succeeds in doing that, then it really does carry an inertia of its own and she really is committed to doing whatever it is that she's told to do by somebody else. Joe: Without having to repeatedly choose to do so. JW: Yeah.  Joe: Right. JW: It just becomes her second nature--and even, if she were then want to reject that project and go back to living a more normal life where she's in control, she would find it difficult. Joe: Yeah. JW: She would feel guilty, for example, in refusing a command by this person and that feeling of guilt would betray the commitment that she still actually has, which is doing what she's told by this person. —- Joe closes the episode. Generous Questions is a podcast about philosophy made at the Department of Philosophy at Queen’s University, Belfast. Use the website www.generousquestions.co.uk to find more resources relating to this episode. Contact Joe using the website or on Twitter at www.twitter.com/drjoemorrison All content is covered by a Creative Commons licence BY-NC-SA https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ Amazing transcription work by Becci.