Checks and Balances Podcast Episode 5:

Paul Rosenzweig: Hello, and welcome to Checks & Balances: Threats to this American Election. 

This weekly podcast is sponsored by Checks & Balances, a group of conservative and libertarian lawyers dedicated to bolstering the rule of law and opposing the degradation of American legal norms. 

My name is Paul Rosenzweig and I'm your host.

Joining me today is my guests on the podcast are Ken Wainstein and John Bellinger. 

And our topic today is the national security consequences of the upcoming election. 

Fostering free and fair elections is not a partisan issue, not a right left issue, not a conservative or libertarian or liberal or progressive issue.

It's an American issue. 

And so, this podcast.

 We aspire higher to offer accurate information that captures the [00:01:00] ground truth about our election process.

 We'll speak about what the law entails, and how to make sure that every legal voter counted. 

We'll also talk about what's at stake in the election and why elections have consequences.

Today, I'm joined by Ken Wainstein and John Bellinger. 

Ken is a former Homeland Security advisor to President Bush.

 He's now a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell. 

John is a former National Security Council legal advisor, and former legal advisor to the Department of State under President Bush.

 And he's now a partner at Arnold & Porter.

Together, they're the co-chairs of a group as Former Republican National Security Officials for Biden, which currently has more than 130 members.

 Other notable members of the group include Senator Chuck Hagel, who was also the Secretary of Defense.

 General Michael Hayden, the former director of both the CIA and the NSA.

Senator John Warner used to represent Virginia.

 And William Webster, the former director of both [00:02:00] the CIA and the FBI.

 As well as at least four former Trump officials. 

I should add that I too am a member of this group.

 Gentlemen, welcome to the podcast. 

Ken Wainstein: Nice to be with you, Paul.

John Bellinger: Thanks Paul. 

Thanks for having us.

Paul Rosenzweig: We begin each week with news from the past week.

 Usually we look at something political that has happened, but in keeping with the theme of this week's podcast, I want to look outside of our border at some of the national security concerns. 

So first off, last week John Bolton, President Trump's former National Security Advisor, predicted that if Trump wins a second term he'll move to withdraw the United States from NATO.

Now let's leave aside whether he is wrong about that prediction or not.

 Let's just discuss what the consequences would be if Bolton is right. 

John, let me start with you.

 How critical is NATO to American security, and how critical is it to our Alliance structure? 

John Bellinger: Well, thanks, Paul. 

And the answer [00:03:00] is NATO is extremely critical to our security, not only in Europe, but around the world.

And it would be calamitous if Donald Trump were to pull us out, something that he has threatened to do for a while. 

I'll just say two things. 

One, this is intensely personal to me because I was actually born at NATO headquarters when it was in Paris, and my father was a young army officer assigned to NATO.

So literally NATO and I have been around for a long time.

 But NATO, which has existed since 1949, has been central to U.S. security in Europe and around the world, not only during the Cold War, but now for out of area operations.

 And it would give an enormous victory to Vladimir Putin if he could get the U.S. Out of NATO, and therefore disengaged from Europe.

Paul Rosenzweig: Ken, what would [00:04:00] you expect our allies to do? 

How would that... what would their reaction be? 

How would this resonate with them as well as with Russia and China?

Ken Wainstein:  Well, just to second what John said, NATO has been absolutely instrumental to our security and the security of the West.

 It's been the foundation of our mutual defense.

And, I agree. 

I think the term calamitous that John used is just right.

 And it would play right into Putin's hands. 

And look, if you look at what Putin has been doing for the last decade or more everything he's done vis-à-vis the West has been designed to weaken our alliances.

 Weaken the strength with which we can confront Russia and its designs.

And they would love nothing more than to see the NATO, which has been the bedrock of our united front against Russia's malignant designs to be weakened.

 And look, going back to Trump's initial, or at least the [00:05:00] rhetoric that he uses against NATO, I understand the concern about other NATO members not carrying their full share.

 Not paying enough for our mutual defense.

 Perfectly legitimate concern, and I understand him raising it.

And to the extent that he makes progress with getting other members of NATO to share the load, that's great. 

But why throw the baby out with the bath water? 

And especially when you throw the baby out, you're going to have, to mix my metaphors, you're going to have Putin there licking his chops with a great prospect of really sort of carving up the countries of NATO and then starting to insinuate Russian influence into each of them and thereby undermining our ability to push back against their efforts to basically recreate a Soviet empire that we thought was relegated to the dustbin of history back, whatever that is, 30 years ago.

Paul Rosenzweig: Yeah. 

But almost exactly 30 years ago.

The wall, the wall came down, and [00:06:00] unification happened. 

So, let me change gears a little bit and let me stay with you, Ken.

Cause the other obvious big news far more significant than Bolton, was the President's diagnosis with COVID-19. 

And now let's be clear.

None of us on this podcast are medical doctors so none of us can offer anything about the prognosis for the President. 

But what we can ask is how the uncertainty created by the President's illness plays out on the international stage. 

And it strikes me that there are two aspects of that Ken, both of which you would have seen from inside the White House.

The first is uncertainty within the administration. 

How is it that power and authority are being allocated today? 

And the second is whether or not a crisis like this affords adversaries an opportunity for opportunism, if you would, that would allow them to [00:07:00] be adventurous, more adventurous than they might've been?

Is this a time of danger or am I overstating it?

Ken Wainstein:  Sure. 

It's a time of danger and a time to be sort of extra vigilant.

 Sort of, for both reasons that you just articulated.

 First, whenever you have a situation where the President is in any way, handicapped, possibly out of commission, or maybe to be out of commission, that's a danger time because you have adversaries who are tracking this and they're thinking, okay, well, let's see if there's a time when there's instability within the U.S. Government.

And when there's instability within the U S government, that could be a time to strike. 

And I don't mean necessarily launch ICBMS at the United States, but maybe they then try to go gobble up a little former Soviet satellite state the same time that we're wrestling with a President, who's potentially at a commission.

 They know it's going to be a little harder for us to mobilize and push back.

So that's just sort of one scenario that you can imagine. 

And [00:08:00] then related to that as your second point, which is whenever we are, we as a nation, are focused on a crisis internally that's an opportunity for adventurism by a Russia or a China, because they know that maybe our focus is inward.

Therefore just, to the point I just made before, it's going to be harder for us to maintain, or bring our focus, to a hotspot externally. 

And so, yeah, in both respects, I think that the impact of COVID on the top levels of the United States government is a time of I wouldn't say  danger as in necessarily we're in danger of nuclear obliteration, but that it is a time that we need to be extra careful that our adversaries might be emboldened to take some step that would be contrary to the interests of ourselves or our allies. 

Paul Rosenzweig: Yeah, it's often kind of difficult to really understand how much national security plays into what [00:09:00] is normally just local election space.

So, let's broaden the lens a bit. 

You guys are members of - founders of - this group, Former Republican National Security Officials for Biden.

 Reflecting, I think a considered judgment that you've made that at this time and in this moment, that's the better choice for America. 

And I want to talk a little bit about why that is, and more broadly, about what the consequences would be for national security in a Trump second term.

And how Trump's first term has affected U.S. Standing in the world.

So let me start with you, John, and just say we've already talked about NATO and that's just one example of Trump's approach to world security leadership.

 In light of what we've seen so far this first term, how do other national leaders view Trump? 

How do they view him in terms of his reliability, and is their viewpoint problematic for U.S. [00:10:00] National security?

John Bellinger: So thanks, Paul. 

So let me say a word about our group which then leads into this very question about U.S. Leadership in the world. 

So Ken and I have an organized group of what's now more than 130 former senior Republican National Security officials, you included. 

And by Republican, we mean people who have served in senior positions and former Republican administrations.

 The George H.W. Bush administration.

 George W. Bush administration.

 The Trump administration.

 The Reagan administration. 

These are people who have devoted their lives to public service at the state department, defense department, justice department, the intelligence agencies, and these are people who are all extremely concerned about Donald Trump's leadership of the country, and the danger that he poses to our national security.

And we believe that Joe Biden would be a better president.

 And one of the reasons, in fact it's the [00:11:00] top on our list of reasons that we give in a statement that we have published in the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere, is that Donald Trump has diminished U.S. leadership in the world.

 For the last 70-80 years since before World War II the United States has been a world leader.

Other countries have looked to us for leadership. 

They don't always agree with us, but they have looked to the U.S. For leadership.

 And Donald Trump has completely diminished the United States and himself and America in the eyes of the world.

 Other leaders think of him as something of a buffoon, a clown, a reality TV show star, more concerned about his own ratings than about even the American people, much less leadership in the world.

He's criticized our closest allies in very personal terms. 

Theresa May, the leaders of Canada, France, Australia, [00:12:00] Angola Merkel, others.

He's withdrawn from all sorts of international organizations and agreements.

The World Health Organization, the Paris climate change. 

He may disagree with these, but these are entities that other countries believe in and that by pulling out of them, by threatening to pull out of NATO and other alliances, Donald Trump diminishes U.S. Leadership in the world. 

There was a, and I'll end with this, go over to Ken. 

There was a Pew study this summer of views of the U.S. in the world right now. 

And the U.S. international reputation is at an all-time low.

 It's the lowest, since the Pew began polling.

People in more than a dozen close U.S Allies, said they have more confidence in Vladimir Putin [00:13:00] and Xi Jinping of China to do the right thing than they do of Donald Trump.

Paul Rosenzweig: So Ken, I've said that to many people and they normally tell me that I'm, I'm just sour grapes. 

They say that Trump's national security policies have actually been a success.

 They point for example, to his withdrawal from the Paris Accords, which they think was averse to U.S. Interests. 

His withdrawal from the Uranian JCPOA, which was again, they think, adverse to American interests.

 The movement of the embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, which they say is a recognition of an ally’s necessity withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan that is ongoing.

That is reducing our overseas footprint. 

So give me your perspective.

 Are those legitimately seen as wins for Trump and how should we view them in the context of our discussion today?

Ken Wainstein:  Well, I think we look at it from several different [00:14:00] perspectives.

 First they're, there are going to be people, a whole constituency of people who are in favor of each of those developments.

 Who are in favor of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

 Who are in favor of withdrawing from the Paris Accords.

And they all have their own reasons.

 Let's look at it though, from the perspective of the President, who's supposed to be thinking not just about each of those particular constituencies, but what's broadly best for the United States.

 I think these examples are pristine examples of where Trump looks at a national security issue, frankly any issue, through one lens and one lens only.

Which is what's best for Donald Trump.

And this is going to the heart of the reason why John and I are so passionate about this group that we pulled together to support Joe Biden for national security purposes.

 Because that's terribly dangerous in any area, but especially in the national security area.

 I think Trump sees these as [00:15:00] wins.

He sees each of these as wins, but the reason he sees them as a win is because they show that he is sort of keeping his campaign promises and he's going it alone. 

He's making, thinking about every issue in terms of what's first for America and not worrying about the repercussions.

And I believe that's what you see is that he doesn't really care about the ripple effects of this. 

And as a result, he's not thinking about what it means to be out of the Paris Accords other than that, he's able to tout that as a win politically for him.

And not only does that ignore the repercussions of his decision making, which is, that's symptomatic of all his decision making, it also means that he's relegating us into a non-leadership position.

 Every time he pulls him out of an agreement.

 He pulls himself out of an Alliance.

 He's having American leadership recede further and further from the scene and therefore we [00:16:00] have less and less influence. 

So, and that I think is really very dangerous for us because we are a world leader.

We have to be a world leader, and frankly, we stand for the right things as a nation. 

We want to be in the lead in terms of spreading those values around the world. 

And by having our leadership proceed this way, it's bad for our position in the world, but I think it's also bad for the position of the world.

And he doesn't think about any of that. 

And so, while you can look at each of these individually and argue the merits of each decision, I'm mostly concerned with the fact that his decision-making process comes to a decision for one reason and one reason only: what's politically best for Donald Trump. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So, let's follow up on that and modulate the topic slightly.

One of the reasons you two have suggested, that the group has suggested, that Trump is a profound concern for national security reasons is the way in which he's interacted with foreign dictators like Putin and Xi Jinping. 

So, let me ask you first, John, tell [00:17:00] me a little bit about the effect on national security and diplomatic relations when, for example, Trump embraces leaders like Kim Jong Un and speaks of his great respect for the man.

 How should we view his lauding of Xi Jinping as a quote, "brilliant leader"?

 In light of the repression in Hong Kong or the weegar camps, how does that affect our diplomacy? 

John Bellinger: So Donald Trump's embrace of dictators, authoritarian figures, and other international thugs is really one of the most saddening, disappointing, and perplexing aspects of his national security leadership.

And it's something were frankly, Democrats and Republicans agree.

For decades there's been a bipartisan agreement between Democratic and Republican administrations that the United States stands for certain values.

 [00:18:00] That we stand for the spread of democracy.

 For human rights.

 For freedom of the press.

 For freedom of religion.

For women's rights.

While Republican administrations have, sometimes I've been a bit more of a realpolitik approach, having to work with authoritarian regimes like Pakistan or others, you certainly haven't seen U.S. Presidents, even in Republican administrations, embracing dictators and authoritarian leaders.

 Praising them for their leadership, suggesting that it's a great idea that they be President for life. 

The thought of Donald Trump, even though it's, I think many people believe it's fine to try to see if something can be worked out with the North Koreans, that's been a festering problem for decades, but to profess love for Kim [00:19:00] Jong Un and great respect for him, given his human rights abuses is a really quite shocking thing.

 And undermines, U.S. Moral authority around the world.

Again, we all know, the United States is not a perfect country, but the United States, has still for decades, been looked to as a beacon, a city, on a Hill, perhaps an imperfect one, that other countries look to.

 And they expect our presidents to stand for those values and to stand up for democracy, not to be praising and cozying up to dictators like Vladimir Putin. 

So that's really hurting the United States, and what the United States stands for around the world. 

And as Ken says, it really marginalizes us now when the President does not stick up for American values.

Paul Rosenzweig:  So, let's pick up on Putin.

[00:20:00] You've been active in intelligence matters for years. 

So, the one particular question I want to ask you is tell us about the effect of Trump's embrace of Putin in opposition to the conclusions of his own intelligence community. 

Just yesterday the National Security Advisor said that he was happy that Putin and the Russians had confirmed that they weren't going to interfere in the next election.

How does taking that assurance affect morale? 

How does it affect our foreign intelligence sharing with other allied nations?

John Bellinger: Good question. 

And first, as to the assurance that the Russians aren't going to be trying to manipulate our elections this go around, I think we all know that's ridiculous.

Of course they are. 

They're already doing it. 

They did it to great effect and a great success in 2016, and if there's one thing Putin always does is if he has success hurting America, he's going to [00:21:00] repeat whatever he did to achieve that success over and over and over. 

And, we’ve seen that since 2016, and we're going to see those efforts redoubled and we are seeing them redoubled now.

So, I don't, I'm not sure where anybody would come up with the idea that we shouldn't be concerned about Russian interference.

 But in terms of the relationship, or the impact of these - the cozying up with Vladimir Putin on the intelligence community, it's been very damaging.

 This started the very beginning of the Trump administration, actually, even before the inauguration.

When the intelligence community put out its intelligence community assessment, finding that the Russians had intentionally interfered with our election, and that it had been directed by Putin, and that it was done in part to both denigrate Hillary Clinton and help Donald Trump.

 The President, or president-elect that time pushed back on that finding and went public with the allegation that the intelligence community were Nazis.

He analogized them to Nazis, which is a pretty appalling thing to do for a [00:22:00] president-elect in relation to his intelligence community that he's going to have to rely on. 

And the relationship has only gotten worse.

 I mean, soon after that, he had a meeting with Ambassador Kislyak of Russia and disclosed some high level, very secret information to the Russian ambassador.

So all these things make the intelligence community highly suspicious of him, and it helps break, that that kind of conduct, helps to break down the really important relationship between the President, who's the ultimate policy maker, and the intelligence community, that is the source of the information that a conscientious policy maker should be using in deciding what policy decisions to come to.

And so you've got a really dysfunctional relationship right now. 

And in fact, there were even reports recently that the CIA was, that some of the CIA felt like they were trying to sort of govern [00:23:00] or check the flow of information about Russia to the White House because of the concern that the President would react badly to the intelligence that he thinks is contrary to his interest.

 I.E: that makes it look like Vladimir Putin is not our friend.

Which of course he's not. 

And I don't know the validity of those reports, but I think the fact that those reports demonstrate the very difficult scenario, difficult situation that our intelligence community is in dealing with a President like this.

And then, I guess, lastly, you asked about our foreign partners, and you know, concerns that the President's erratic conduct and his willingness to cozy up to a Vladimir Putin or Kim Jong Un might have on our partner's willingness to work closely with us and share with us.

 Of course that's a problem.

Of course our partners see this.

 They see it when the President hands over classified information to the Russian ambassador. 

And I'm sure it's [00:24:00] making them all think twice before disclosing important information to our intelligence community out of the concern that it might end up in Donald Trump's hands and then go straight from there to his buddy buddies in the Russian government.

Ken Wainstein:  Paul I'll jump back in on this, just cause it worries me, and I think it worries almost everybody in our group, the President's relationship with Putin and his soft spot for Russia, maybe it's just because it is so head spinning this change in the Republican party which has historically had grave concerns about first, the Soviet union and then about Russia. 

It doesn't mean that there needed to be a bad relationship.

 Actually, when I was legal advisor at the State Department, we had a decent relationship with the Russians until the Russian invasion of Georgia.

[00:25:00] But Putin's refusal, uh, I'm sorry, Donald Trump's refusal to say anything negative about Putin at all really puts him essentially at war with the rest asked if his own national security establishment, as well as with Republicans in Congress, all of whom know better.

 You recall he's met privately a couple of times with Putin, and then has refused to disclose what they've talked about.

And it's all just rather odd and concerning and I think something that really needs to be plumbed a bit more. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So we've talked about the diplomatic problems that have arisen in the last four years. 

We've just talked about the intelligence problems.

 Let's turn to the military itself.

 The hallmark of our national security.

Trump has said many times that he's on the side of the military.

 That he [00:26:00] rebuilt it from a downturn under Obama. 

That he's the best friend that the military has ever had.

 John let's start by taking those claims on the merit.

 Is it true? 

I mean, is military funding up? 

And if so, what should we make of that?

Is that the hallmark of national security?

John Bellinger:  So answers are yes and no. 

The military funding is up under Donald Trump, over the last couple of years from the Obama administration, but Donald Trump's claims that they are the highest ever is simply false. 

The inflation adjusted dollars, the defense budget, under Donald Trump is actually not as high as it was in the last year of the Bush administration and the first four years of the Obama administration.

 Towards the end of the Obama administration, President Obama and [00:27:00] consistent with mandates from Congress to get spending under control, reduced the defense spending so that when Donald Trump came into office, he did increase it over the last couple of years of the Obama administration, and has been in fact spending money on defense expenditures, but it's not all been on military hardware as he said.

 So, and furthermore, military hardware is not everything.

 Donald Trump, while he may have spent more in the last couple of years on planes and other weapons, he's done a lot of other bad things for the military. 

I come from a long military family and to see Donald Trump politicizing the military, which has historically tried to stay out of politics to use the military, to clear protesters from [00:28:00] Lafayette square.

Threatened to use the insurrection act to deploy the military across the country.

To dip into individual cases of military justice.

I think Donald Trump is actually doing a great disservice to the military. 

He doesn't have the military's back.

As Ken has said before, he's looking out for Donald Trump, not for the military. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So Ken, let me pick up on one thing John just mentioned and dip into it a bit more.

 President Trump has intervened at least four times by my count, perhaps more, in the military justice system.

What effect does that have on the military?

 How appropriate or inappropriate is it? 

And, how does that fit into your general sense that Trump's actions are mostly for his own benefit? 

Ken Wainstein: Yeah, that's terribly troubling. 

I mean, it's - [00:29:00] I want to the question out or the answer out I should say, to just address his willingness and eagerness to intervene in the justice systems generally.

I mean, he's done that countless times in the criminal justice system.

 It's been clear that his interests in various cases, you can look at the Stone and Flynn case, have been felt by the Justice Department and then have translated into decisions and actions taken by the Justice Department.

 And the same goes for the military justice system where he's been willing to step in and take actions for his own reasons and according to his own thinking. 

And the problem with that of course, is that the foundation of confidence in a justice system is that it runs on the facts and the law and doesn't run on the whims of a leader.

 And, once you have a leader [00:30:00] acting according to his whim and dictating results, that undermines confidence in that Judicial system.

That applies both for the criminal system, our criminal system in the article three courts, but also for the military justice system. 

And I think it also in the military context, it has an added detriment that it undermines the careful balancing of the judicial system to avoid command influence.

 In the military system that's very much a concern. 

There are safeguards that are legion throughout the process to prevent command influence from influencing or dictating the results of the justice system that are to be based on facts and law. 

And this is sort of the classic example of the ultimate commander coming in and influencing the system.

Paul Rosenzweig: So let's transition, lastly, to a kind of consideration of the [00:31:00] institutional interests. 

If I had to say what the deep state means to me, it's American institutions and systems and processes.

 From a Trumpian perspective, that's in opposition to his interests.

 From an American perspective it seems to me that's the ground of our governance.

So let me start with you, Ken.

You were the Homeland Security Advisor.

 You worked closely with the National Security Advisor. 

What's the proper role and function of those two jobs, and how does that proper functioning compare with how they've operated under Trump? 

Ken Wainstein: That's I think a very important question.

And I think that goes to a general, not lack of understanding, but insufficient understanding by the public of the importance of some of the internal processes of government and [00:32:00] how much Trump has damaged the ability to govern by his lack of observing those processes. 

I get it. 

I get the concern that a new president comes in, a number of political appointees come in throughout the federal government, and they're trying to implement the President's agenda and sometimes that might cause, that might run into some resistance by the bureaucracy. 

That's an age-old problem in DC.

 And that's actually part of the dynamic that makes the government work.

 Every four years or whenever there's a new president who comes in, especially if there's a change in party, you have a change in approach in every agency. 

And it takes a little work to move the agency, but career officials should salute and do what's directed by the political officials so long, of course it's when the balance of propriety and lawful.

That's okay.

 But what Trump is saying is that this is there's a deep state [00:33:00] conspiracy beyond just that sort of the bureaucratic, push and pull of a DC government here in DC. 

And a great example of that is the National Security Council.

 The inner agency process that is run out of the White House in which you know, historically you have the heads of all the relevant agencies coming together to deal with an issue.

Let's say it's dealing with North Korea, you'd have the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense you'd have the Attorney General, you know, everybody who has some role in dealing with North Korea, and they'd sit down and they'd think through an issue.

 Think through a policy, the policy options, and then come up with recommendation for the President.

And it's a great way of making sure that you look at an issue, like from a perspective of 360 degrees.

 Think about all the ramifications of whatever policy you adopt, and you give the best recommendation of the President for all the interests at stake.

 Diplomatic, military, [00:34:00] economic, et cetera.

That's really important process. 

And as I see it from where I sit the President is not really paying much attention to that process because he looks at decisions, as we said earlier through one single lens, which is what's best for him. 

So he's not too concerned about the ramifications. 

He's not too concerned about getting the best advice from the people who are the best experts.

He's just concerned with deciding, often according to his quote, unquote "gut" what he thinks is best for him. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So, John, you were at the Department of State for a while, and I think that's where you and I first met, yet traditionally, the Secretary of State stays out of politics. 

Secretary Pompeo has not.

I think of his taking part in the Republican convention from Jerusalem as an example.

 Or his recent proposed trip to the Vatican though the Pope declined to see him. 

How [00:35:00] out of bounds out of character is this kind of conduct, and how does this affect the state department's ability to function?

John Bellinger:  So it's very out of character.

 Almost all secretaries of state, for, gosh, I don't know, 30-40 years have been political people.

Maybe George Marshall was the last Secretary to not be terribly political, but the rest of them have been political people.

But when they become Secretary of State, they have generally stayed out of partisan political politics. 

It's not because of the Hatch Act because they, as a senior political appointee can do things that are exempt from the Hatch Act.

It's simply by tradition that has long been observed that the Secretary of State and senior officials at the State Department, do not get involved in partisan political politics because then appears to the rest of the [00:36:00] world, and in the United States, but to the rest of the world, that they're only representing some portion of the American people.

They're only representing as the nation's top diplomat Republicans or Democrats. 

So that's why historically Secretaries of State have not attended or spoken at their national conventions and have not engaged in political activities.

You know, there's a new book out about Jim Baker as Secretary of State, who was certainly a political person.

He was a brilliant political leader, but when he was Secretary of State, he stayed out of politics.

 So, for Secretary Pompeo to engage in political activity, like speaking at the convention, really is a real breaking of traditional norms. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So, 

John Bellinger: Ken.

Paul Rosenzweig:  Let's take [00:37:00] another agency. 

You were Homeland Security Advisor.

You worked with, closely with, Michael Chertoff. 

The secretary of DHS who I work for.

 DHS hasn't had a confirmed leader for more than 550 days now.

 The longest cabinet vacancy in American history.

 How does that affect operations at a cabinet department? 

Ken Wainstein: Yeah, that's really, it's terribly detrimental to the effectiveness of any agency to have somebody at the top of that agency be in the acting capacity for a long period of time.

I was acting U.S. Attorney for a while and I thought, I didn't really feel limited. 

It often happens that you have people in acting capacity for a while.

 But the problem with that is that you don't have the same, you don't sort of have the same latitude.

You also don't, aren't perceived as having the same authority. 

If you're not confirmed, and so on the margins that can [00:38:00] actually really make a difference. 

And, that's both externally outside the agency when the agency is trying to sort of stake out its ground in an inner agency kind of difference of opinion. 

 But also internally, because this has been whatever, 550 days where internally people are looking at that person as a temporary leader.

 Not somebody who's going to be engaging in long-term change of the agency. 

So it undermines that person's ability to effect change within the agency over the long-term. 

And just to round out that point, if there's an agency which needs that kind of leadership it's DHS, because DHS is a huge sprawling agency.

And conglomeration of whatever it was, 22 separate agencies, that just came together whatever it was 17 years ago.

 Which in the life of a bureaucracy is relatively recent, and it's still sort of finding its way within [00:39:00] the DC bureaucracy.

 And that's why we need people like Michael Chertoff and others who are strong leaders to solidify the DHS and make it an effective agency.

And it's still got a ways to go in that process and having somebody as an acting for whatever it is, a year and a half in duration, that doesn't help the process. 

Paul Rosenzweig: So John, let's finish this with one last agency. 

Give me your assessment of the role of the Attorney General, and Attorney General Barr's performance vis-a-vis national security in the election.

John Bellinger:  Let me say two things about that.

 One, the fact that you say last agency is symptomatic of this administration, and it's what makes me and Ken and the 130 Former  Republican Administration National Security Officials, so concerned that Trump has systematically dismantled and diminished and hollowed out and [00:40:00] undermined the abilities of all of our national security departments and agencies.

 The Department of State, the Department of Defense, even if he's given them more hardware, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Justice.

So I've known Bill Barr for a long time. 

I was a young associate at the partner that he was a law firm in, so I've known him for more than 30 years.

 And I've always had a great respect for him and his intellect when he was head of OLC, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General. 

I was hopeful when he was appointed Attorney General that he would be a real adult here.

And I, and many others, and Paul, you know this from our work at Checks & Balances have been surprised and very disappointed with Attorney General Barr.

Because he's one, acted more as the President's personal attorney seems to be trying to defend him and his actions at every turn, [00:41:00] and two, and Ken can speak to this as well as a longtime Department of Justice prosecutor, completely undermined morale, and indeed public confidence, in the Department of Justice by appearing to make it political.

 Suggesting that it's been politicized.

 Interfering in individual prosecutions.

 And really undermining the role of prosecutors and even of the FBI.

 And it's a very sad thing. 

I spent four years at the Department of Justice before I moved to the White House, and all of us are very proud of that independence that the Department of Justice has had, and Bill Barr has really undermined morale in the Department.

 It's a sad and really very perplexing thing that I hope can be restored in a Biden administration. 

Paul Rosenzweig: Well, all of that has got to be amongst the [00:42:00] most depressing set of conversations I've had in the last few days.

Unfortunately, with some degree of accuracy. 

So let me, let me look forward a bit. 

Let me, let me look forward a bit. 

And, since I - since we don't want to keep people too long, let's just do one set of questions for you. 

You've both said that you're supporting Biden. 

Let's assume he wins. 

What one does you expect him to do that you're going to approve of in this national security space and tell me something that you expect him to do that you're going to wish he didn't do.

That you're going to be opposed to on a policy grounds.

 Ken, you go first.

 Look, I think the first thing he's going to do, and this dovetails with the comments we've made so far in this broadcast, is that he's going to reach out to our allies.

He's going to let them know that we stand with them, that the understanding we've had since the end of World War II, that we are the leader of the free [00:43:00] world, and that we're going to stand with anybody who allies us allies with us to protect the free world.

 That we have sort of reassumed that mantle, and that we'll do it aggressively.

Now, keep in mind. 

That doesn't mean, and I believe this is the way that President Biden would calibrate that message, that doesn't mean that we're going to give in to the interests of our allies. 

That doesn't mean that we're not gonna insist on pushing our own national interests, but rather it's a recognition that our national interest is consistent with being a leader in promoting the interests of likeminded countries in defending freedom and pushing back on regimes like the Russian and Chinese and North Korean regimes. 

So I think that outreach and that comfort that they're going to, he will give to our allies is going to be critical in helping us, helping to restore us to a role of [00:44:00] leadership around the world.

 In terms of the things that he would not do, that he would do that I would disagree with in the national security space. 

I honestly, I find a Vice President Biden to be relatively centrist.

 I was quite relieved when he got the nod as the Democratic nominee. 

As opposed to somebody who in the national security space would be, quite, take a quite divergent view of the reality of the national security space that I do.

So I actually, I don't see any one area where I'm really gravely concerned that he's going to take us down a perilous path.

 And as we've said, as our group has said in our statement, this is the group that John and I are a part of, and you and I, you are a part of as well. 

That look we get it, that they're going to be policy differences, but now is not the time for those policy differences to be debated.

But rather now is the time to get Donald Trump out of the Oval Office, get Joe Biden in, and then we can have the rational debate [00:45:00] about sort of how best to pursue our national interests.

 But at least at that point, we'll have a President who cares about our national interest and not just his own. 

John, how about you?

John Bellinger: So I'll just take a different part of that.

One that I'm very excited about if Biden wins, and I'm certain that he will do, is to rebuild our national security departments and agencies, and particularly the State Department where I most recently served.

That's been completely hollowed out with lots of people leaving.

I'm confident that he will increase the budget and put a real emphasis on diplomacy around the world. 

And this is not just to sort of make nice with other countries this is to get things done for the United States. 

Donald Trump talks about being transactional, but the way we do transactions and deals with other countries is through our effective [00:46:00] diplomacy at the State Department.

So I'm excited that he will rebuild the State Department, but hopefully confidence in the Justice Department and our Intelligence Agencies.

 And then I know Ken and I are both confident that he will put in good people in senior positions at all of these departments and agencies.

 Donald Trump has really had a hard time recruiting, good people, and then he fires them along the way, which results in a really very poor team. 

I don't know how Donald Trump could staff a second term because he's already scratching the bottom of the barrel. 

But I know Ken and I are both pretty excited about the kinds of people, decent people with experience, who Joe Biden would put in if he were elected.

 As far as disagreement, I can, it's hard to know.

 I do worry that Joe Biden has had to make peace with the far [00:47:00] left of his party. 

We know that some of the people in the Bernie Sanders camp would like to completely defund I think the defense department as well, but I just don't think that's going to happen.

I don't think there's support for that in Congress. 

And I don't think that Joe Biden himself would support that. 

So, we'll have to see, but there's nothing at this point that I particularly worry about in a Joe Biden administration. 

Paul Rosenzweig: Well, that's a little more upbeat news. 

I'm glad we ended there.

And as I've said before, on this podcast, we always try to end the podcast with good news.

 Today there's a little more, and it's simple.

 Though we're under stress, the number of people who've already voted is a stunning confirmation of America's fundamental strength.

 In Florida today more than 300,000 ballots have already been counted. 

So that's also good news, and that's going to be a wrap for our show guys. 

[00:48:00] Thanks for joining us.

 At Checks & Balances we believe in the rule of law, the power of truth, and the independence of the criminal justice system.

 We believe that these principles apply regardless of party or person in power.

And our goal is to remind the nation that free speech, a free press, separation of powers, and a limited government, are the bedrock of the American experiment.

 We'll be releasing a new show every Monday.

 This episode, and all future episodes are available on Apple, Spotify, Stitcher, and anywhere you want to find it, you can also find them archived @checks-and-balances.org.

If you want to find them on our website. 

Thanks again to Ken Wainstein and John Bellinger for joining me today on the podcast. 

I'm Paul Rosenzweig your host and today's rule of law quote for the day is something Carolyn Kennedy said. 

"The bedrock of our democracy," she said, “is the rule of law. That means we have to have an independent judiciary and judges who can make decisions independent of the political winds [00:49:00] that are blowing."

Next week, we'll talk about the Supreme court nomination of Amy Coney Barrett. 

Join us then. 

Thanks a lot for joining me.