Augusta DellÕOmo: Welcome to Right Rising a podcast from the Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right. I'm your host Augusta DellÕOmo. Today I'm joined by Balsa Lubarda, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy at Central European University. He's here with us today to explain why ideology is important to the radical right, and particularly to far right ecologists. Balsa, thanks for being here. Balsa Lubarda: Thank you for inviting me. AD: So let's start off with defining ideology and for our listeners, you are the head of our ideology research unit. So I'm going to put you on the spot and ask, why is ideology important in researching the contemporary radical right? And then can you give us an example of what this looks like in practice? Because this can be a very nebulous concept. Balsa: Of course, um, ideologies are, uh, The best way to think of ideologies is to think of them as clusters of political concepts. And these concepts of course, have to be de-contested or read, deciphered in a particular way. Um, for instance, uh, liberty, if we take liberty as an example, liberty is the central element of liberalism, but that liberty is not the same as in anarchism. The same can be argued about the concept of equality in liberalism and socialism equality stands for two entirely different things in these ideologies. Um, The best way to think of ideologies is to think of them in terms of, uh, rooms. And this that's the metaphor that, uh, Michael Freeden the leading scholar of ideology studies has used. Um, so if we think of ideologies as rooms in a house, uh, for instance, the bedroom, uh, each room has its particular pieces of furniture, which are arranged in a, in a particular way. And if we think, uh, of, uh, the bedroom, for instance, the central piece of furniture or something that the bedroom cannot go without is of course the bed. Uh, so the bed would be that central decor concept within, uh, the ideology of a bedroom. But of course we have other pieces of furniture in, uh, in, um, Uh, bedroom. I mean, that can be a cupboard, uh, that can be a mirror, which are either adjacent to the beds, uh, or, uh, very important for the bedroom as, as a room or, uh, they can be ephemeral or peripheral to, to, to that, uh, to that particular room. So if we are to think of ideologies in that way, uh, then we can sort of think of what are the concepts that constitute an ideology, uh, as, as the, what are the building blocks of an ideology? Um, the problem with ideology is that, uh, it is a notion which has long been, uh, burdened by the negativity, uh, like the spectrum of negativity in a way poured from the theorists of all kinds and scholarly backgrounds. Ideology has long been, uh, considered a form of false consciousness, a distortion of reality, a hegemonical structure, or basically something which requires some form of unmasking or dismantling. Uh, and if we think of that way, I mean, if we think in these terms, the problem with these conceptions, and there are many of, of these readings is that, um, we ended up being, uh, we ended up giving too much power to the ideologues or the ideologists - people who apparently have the power to subtly impose or to deceive. Uh, and that's, I see a very important problem. When we think of ideologies the core term, the key words that should come to our mind is flexibility. So, uh, ideologies are not really something rigid. Uh, when we say ideologies are rigid, we are actually talking about the proponents of these ideologies, uh, who may appear, convinced or adamant in expressing their views and beliefs. Uh, In, in a sense of political theory, ideologies are as pliant and as bendable as they can be. Um, they're susceptible to change over time, and this is another very important component that we need to keep in mind. Um, I can use the old washed out, uh, washed out example of what conservatism or liberalism for instance stood for. If we compare conservatives in 19th century conservatism to today's conservatism, we're not going to come to the same conclusions. And we're not going to come to, even to the same, uh, pieces of furniture, uh, to speak in, in, in the conceptual, in conceptual terms. So, um, these are not same things anymore. And the same actually, uh, works with the radical right. Uh, ideologies can adapt and become relevant time and again. Radical right is undeniably a case, a case in point, um, what was known as the radical right in 1920s, for instance, uh, when it's more or less merged with fascism or national socialism is not the same as, uh, in the 1970s with the Nouvelle Droite or, uh, the national populism morphing into the radical right of today. Um, so this is something that these are like sort of the fine lines that we need to keep in mind. Um, and other things that, that I think is worth considering is that a lot of people will say today that we've paused at the time of ideologies. And I actually had that with my own respondents, um, many, I mean, this happened numerous times. Uh, that ideologies don't really exist anymore. The, at the end of history was the end of ideologies to evoke that ill-fated coinage of Francis Fukuyama. Uh, so I basically think that we need ideology more than ever. Uh, the point is to exactly identify these obscurities these subtle gray zones, uh, because they are ultimately defining our reality and to give an example of how messages devoid of ideological reading can, can be actually dangerous. Um, I think I can, I mean, I can provide the, the well-known and very recent example of ÒWe Are the VirusÓ of eco-fascism. Um, we have undeniably done we, when I say we I'm talking about humankind, or as Justin Trudeau would say, peoplekind we've undoubtedly done a lot of harm to the environment, but it is a slippery slope. And the question where does one stop from this ÒWe Are the VirusÓ to let's say, um, I don't know, one-child policy or killed the and educated or underprivileged. So this is something that we really need to think of. We need to keep in mind when it comes to ideology. For sure. AD: Thanks for setting that up for us. And I really appreciate your, your metaphor of the room. It's one that we've used before, um, in history or political science, but I think it's one of the best ways to explain how these different concepts can be changed in and out and that they're not always super rigid. You mentioned eco-fascism, which I think is something that many people have a sort of popular culture, mainstream idea of what ecoterrorists or eco-fascism is from television or movies. So as someone who studies this, what is eco-fascism, and what are some of the problems with even this term? BL: Yeah. So eco-fascism is, um, when I mentioned ÒWe Are the VirusÓ example, it is definitely an eco-fascist framing, but that doesn't mean that all of the people who are using are eco-fascists, people are sometimes just not aware of the framings and the metaphors that they're using in daily life and how they can lead to very problematic understandings of the world. Um, eco-fascism is what I mean, the problem with, with that sentence. And that statement is that it points to, um, the fears of overpopulation and neo-Malthusianism, uh, which is one of the fundamental, uh, the core convictions of eco-fascism. Um, so, as I said, um, these ideas can be found elsewhere. And the people who use such messages are entirely unaware of the fact that such framing is shared by those who bind to the say blood and soil, the ableist vision of the world, which is something that eco-fascists, uh, are into. Um, now I understand why eco-fascism as a term has gained popularity in today's, uh, pandemic defined era. It is undeniably a soundbite. It is something that, uh, attracts attention. And when you say eco-fascism, everyone seems to know what one is talking about. Um, however, uh, eco-fascism, as a term, I find fairly insufficient to account for the entirety of far-right engagements with the natural environment. Um, and when I say far-right, I'm talking about, uh, it's a term from, from the scholarship, which, uh, brings together the radical and the extreme right. So the, the, um, both the extra-parliamentary, uh, actors who are openly willing to dismantle democratic order, and those who are still playing within the, within the boundaries of the, of, of the democratic liberal democracy, liberal democratic order. Um, but what I basically wanted to say is that, uh, the problem of eco-fascism is that it is narrow and synoptic and there's such a, makes us focus on something which is realistically speaking, not really a problem. Uh, if we leave Christchurch and the El Paso terrorist, aside, um, people who really did not commit their abominable acts because of eco-fascist motives, even though they mentioned, they made some reference to, to the environment, uh, there had been no cases of, of, uh, or at least there haven't been numerous cases of eco-fascist violence. It's not something which we should be necessarily worried about. Um, what I suggested in my work is that if we want to really understand what the relationship between the radical right and the environment is, we should embrace, uh, sort of a conceptual, um, we, we should embrace a conceptual change, um, using the term far-right ecologism, which is a kind of, uh, that conceptual innovation. And that conceptually innovation is not developed to ameliorate eco-fascist rhetoric, but instead to serve as an attempt to identify the broader pool of right-wing ecologies the far-right is leaning on. And what I mean by that is that, um, to, to really understand the relationship between the radical right and the environment we have to look at the broader, uh, pool of right-wing ideologies. So we need to look at the relationship of conservatism with the environment, which is something the far-right, uh, has really capitalized on. Uh, for instance, the works of Roger Scruton, uh, that's probably one of the good examples. We have to also think about the relationship of the so-called Òthin-centered ideologies,Ó such as nationalism or populism. Their relationship with the environment is also profound and it cannot really be brought down to the overpopulation argument and eco-authoritarianism of a sort. Um, so the main difference between far-right ecologism, and eco-fascism, is that eco-fascism I see eco-fascism as a sort of a subsection of far-right ecologism, uh, which integrates this conservative notion of responsibility for the environment and anthropocentrism, which, uh, is another major difference. Um, eco-fascists are generally speaking, um egocentrics um, so they do belong to these, uh, sort of tributaries or proponents of deep ecology, such as the work of Pentti Linkola whereas most of the far-ecologists are actually anthropocentric and believe in some form of Christian ecologism. Anyways, the building blocks as I said, if we think of far-right ecologism and as an ideology, uh, the building blocks of far-right ecologists ecologism are, uh, Manichaeism, the rhetoric, uh, the us versus them. Um, naturalism and organicism is the three main, main blocks. Uh, and I identified also the peripheral concepts such as, uh, autarchy, spirituality, and mysticism authority, um, et cetera. Um, nostalgia is also a very good example of, of some of the far-right ecologism. But what we need to understand. And one thing that I would actually like to emphasize with this difference, conceptual difference between far-right ecologism and eco-fascism is that it also makes us think about, uh, the history of environmental thought because far-right ecologism and is not merely building on the pragmatic opportunism, uh, of, you know, environment being a vote winning subject, uh, which one needs to be engaging with in order to win power. So there is actually a profound ideological link. If we look back into 19th into the 19th century and, uh, the very beginnings of the ecological thought have continuously mirrored, various forms of far-right ecologism and throughout the history. So, um, we, that sort of, uh, I believe that far-right ecologism and as a concept, um, makes us put things into perspective as well, which is something that I have a feeling that the contemporary environmental movement, as eclectic as it is, hasn't really, um, had that somewhat painful, uh, encounter with the history with, with, with its history thus far. AD: I think thatÕs absolutely fantastic how you set out these different contexts that as you're saying, far-right ecologists operate, um, and that there are branches inside of what we think of or what you're conceptualizing as far-right ecology. So thinking about how people transition into far-right ecology is there a standard route into this? Do people become nationalist or white nationalists first, or is it a concern of the environment? How do people enter a space of far-right ecology from your research? BL: I will say it doesn't really matter because, uh, It comes both ways, basically. Um, people who are proponents or supporters of far-right ecologism may view environmental protection as an integral parts of nationalism. This is something that I've encountered most often. So whenever I ask, uh, whenever I talk to, to, uh, representatives of respondents from the far-rights representatives of far-right organizations, they would say it comes as of second nature. Um, itÕs basically something that goes without saying that every national issue would protect the environment. Um, At the same time, there are also some non-radical, um, non-authoritarian, uh, aspects of nationalism, which may seem appealing to those profoundly interested in the face of the environment. And of course us as human beings on it. Um, so as I said, it goes both ways. I would say it's most often. Uh, and I actually tried to talk more to the representatives of far-right organizations rather than um, people who are not members of these organizations, but holds such views. Uh, but, uh, it's, it's, uh, as I said, it works both ways. It's a topic that is, uh, gaining traction. It's a topic that is becoming more and more salient, uh, unfortunately, because of what's going on with the environment, uh, and the climates. But, uh, what, uh, what I think central here is the ideal of autarky for both, uh, this rejection of globalism as, as in free trade. Um, because globalism and the, of course I'm using the terminology of my respondents here, but, uh, in their view, um, this has done a lot of harm to the people they think of as diligent and hardworking. Uh, for instance, farmers who are unfortunately an easy target to such framings. It's very easy to convince one of a farmer someone who's really working on the land, that it is the land that is in danger, uh, and that, uh, the environmental issues can also be an issues, uh, of, of the somehow related to the nation to the, to, uh, basically, the heritage, the cultural heritage, the national heritage, everything that, that soil, uh, to, to follow the blood and soil, uh, framing that the soil has. So, yeah, it's it, it can, it can be, uh, it can, it's not really unidirectional. AD: And I think that point about it not being unidirectional transitions into my next question. Um, you've mentioned that you would consider eco-fascism is one strand of far-right ecologism. So are there different coherent strands that you've identified in your research? BL: Yeah. So I obviously mentioned eco-fascism and for instance, the Greenline Front, uh, recently, uh, I wrote a piece with, uh, with my colleague Bernhard Forchtner, on an example of a transnational eco-fascist organization. Uh, and the reason why I meant why I mentioned earlier in this podcast that I don't find eco-fascism really to be the dangerous, because that phenomenon was short-lived that organization is not existing anymore. Uh, there are, of course, some schools and, and, and, and smaller, uh, sections of organizations that are eco-fascist, but they're not really a problem. Um, Besides eco-fascists we can also think about, for instance, Christian ecologists. Uh, I encountered many in Poland who are following the work of, uh, St. Francis, uh, the Assisi. Um, I cannot say that they are necessarily belonging to the radical right. And in fact, the number of Christian ecologists, I know are very left-wing oriented to, just to be straightforward on that thing, but some of the groups, uh, are followed by, by nationalist organizations in countries I spent some time working on. So, um, of course Christian ecologists are definitely an example. We have animal welfare activists, um, who, uh, a lot of them, the animal welfare activists, for instance, in Hungary or in Serbia are also belonging to football ultras to the, uh, to that part of the radical right in there undeniably, uh, like with, uh, with a clear nationalist bent. Um, so they, they're not really eco-fascist in, in, in, in that literal sense that they are eco-centric, but they do care about animals and they don't like to see them hurt and they will do something about it. And, uh, you can guess that that something will usually entail, uh, violence. Um, it's, it's really a wide pool of actors. If we're thinking about the sections of radical right parties, um, ecological section, some of the radical right parties already have their ecological sections, especially in Eastern Europe. So, um, what these people, it's usually the young people who are taking part in these and who are leading these - their, uh, views and beliefs are, are, uh, in no way similar to that of eco-fascism. Um, as I said, they're mostly informed by these conservative notion of stewardship, uh, taking care of the land, uh, and the environment as some form of a cultural heritage. Uh, it's quite anthropocentric in a sense, and a very close to, to that Christian ecologism, but it just goes in, in different ways and, uh, it can be oriented against migrants as well. Uh, as people who are sort of the Òmatter out of placeÓ to evoke that will well-known, uh, DouglasÕs coinage. Um, so people who are not belonging there who are not really, uh, Pretty much rooted in that soil, uh, and who due to these reasons they, they of course do not care about that environment. And that's the type of framing that they assert, uh, which is something that you will hear quite often from, from opponents of migration, regardless of whether they belong to the radical right or, uh, just brought the right-wing positions. So generally speaking, it is a very, uh, wide pool of actors that we're talking about in far-right ecologism. AD: I think that last point about how they're interacting with mainstream conservative ideas is critical, especially IÕm considering the United States context, where I live, where there's a strong strand in conservative, right-wing thinking of climate change denialism. So I was hoping that you could talk a little bit about the relationship between far-right and climate change, whether it's far-right ecologist or perhaps it's something even outside of that. BL: Yep. And so, uh, again, to, to, to use the words of Prunella Clough, this is the thing in translation, in transition, everything, everything is on the move. Um, the arguments about the far right being climate denial is that this point to me are very much unconvincing. Um, at least from, from the context that I'm working in. Uh, I know that's not the case in the U.S. and, uh, this is, of course, this is where the, the power of context comes into play. But, uh, the radical right, for instance, in Hungary is almost unanimously acknowledging the existence of anthropogenic climate change. Like I'm talking about 99% of the organizations, um, in the other countries of the V4 the Visegr‡d region, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland and elsewhere where I conducted my research, the skepticism is more, um, associated with a range of responses to climate change. So we're talking about the so-called response skepticism and what I'm, what I mean by that is, uh, the radical rights actors are against, uh, banning plastic straws instead of hammering on the bigger, biggest polluters and abolishing free trade, rather than, than being evidence uh, skeptics what you mentioned, uh, thinking that climate change is a hoax. It's something that is fabricated, uh, by the elites or by the deep state or anything that may go along these lines that we unfortunately listen to too often, uh, in these days, not only with regard to climate change, but unfortunately, due to this virus, that is, that is, uh, most of that is keeping most of us, uh, at home or unable to, to, to work properly. And I think this is obviously due to the extent to which the evidence is unanimously showing the existence of the anthropogenic climate change. So, um, the far-right has realized at least in these countries that I'm working in, um, that it's impossible, that it's sort of counter-intuitive, it makes no sense to, uh, reject climate change the existence of climate change. But I think it's also due to a recognition uh, coming from the radical, right that these topics can be easily connected to that existing ideological buildup of far-right ecologism. And, and this is why I mentioned that we need to keep the history into context, the history of environmental thought, um, far-right ecologists are not simply activating something for pragmatic reasons out of the blue. Of course, it is part of the reason, but there is an existing ideological link, which, which, uh, the far-right, uh, taps taps into and, uh, operationalizes it in today's, uh, debates and discussions. So I think we will, what we will see more, there is a clear tendency, uh, again, I'm being very Eurocentric here in, in talking about this and pardon me for saying so for, for, I mean, making this, this assumption, but I think what we will see in the future is more acceptance, uh, on behalf of the, of the radical right and far-right actors in general, if we're talking about eco-fascists, uh, proper eco-fascist organizations, extreme right organizations, uh, well, again, 99% of the cases, they will be accepting the existence of climate change. It is just the type of skepticism that they, that they point to is, is, uh, uh, more related to the types of responses. So the polluter pays principle is not something that they really believe in. Uh, and the well-grounded actually argument of, uh, the biggest polluters in this world, not paying, uh, um, sufficient share and not, uh, really, uh, standing for the values that, that, uh, they sometimes nominally are representing. Uh, so talking about the biggest polluters such as China, the United States, Uh, as we unfortunately can also witness, uh, that there is some truth in these claims as well. Uh, and this is why I think that this, uh, change this very subtle, but gradual change, which is happening at the moment is, uh, something we need to keep in mind because, uh, it will be very relevant for the future. It will be, um, it can lead to a situation where we will have, uh, more and more, uh, far-right, right-wing nationalists, radical right nationalists who are, um, possibly even becoming, uh, I, I can actually anticipate them becoming the leaders of green parties or, or, uh, um, some form of, of, uh, environmental, uh, section of a political party or something along these lines. Uh, and this is something just to, to, to, to be aware of. AD: I think the context that you set out, you know, you said that you apologize for being Eurocentric, but it is so different than the United States context and debates around climate change. So I think that distinction is incredibly important. You've done a bit of future, uh, anticipating, but what kinds of futures do you think we can anticipate for these groups, particularly in the context of this pandemic? BL: Um, it is, yeah, the future questions are always the most difficult ones to address. AD: Um, and, and the ones we don't really want to do as academics. Yeah. BL: Exactly because, because we, we enter a field where it's, as I said, it's a slippery slope. We're lacking evidence for, we we're, we're bringing the unsupported claims. Uh, but what I think in terms of the future is, uh, I had plenty of discussions with very intelligent respondents coming from radical nationalist, extreme nationalist circles. Um, what I'm trying to, and what I tried to emphasize in my lectures or public talks or whatever I say for the public speak for the public is that you really, and when I say you, each of us should think twice about who your favorite farmer, but also your physician, your travel guide, or university professor in biology is in terms of ideology. Uh, I profoundly believe there is merit in discussing some of these subjects in person, uh, as online discussions are really bound to get hostile at some point, um. It may sound a bit too compassionate, but believing in these face-to-face interactions with people who we profoundly disagree with, it can be, can be, uh, not necessarily a solution to the problem, but it can help us understand what kinds of framings we need to think about. If we're talking about the future, um, what I can definitely anticipate is a far-right ecologists or eco-fascists permeating the mainstream, uh, which has already happened in many places, particularly if we think of local environmental justice movements or local environmental activism. So I'm talking about the local grassroots scale. Um, what we're also doing is, um, if we, if we were running the risk of labeling anything that is even remotely radical with regard to our ecologically harmful way of life, uh, our conceptions of an ecologically comfortable way of life, uh, we run the risk of labeling it fascist, um, and that's not always helpful. Uh, it is good sometimes the point, uh, it's always good to point to dangerous framings, but, uh, I think that we may, may lead to it may lead us to a situation where the radical change, which is undeniably necessary, um, coming from, uh, the non-nationalist side can be, can be seen as, as eco-fascist. What I'm trying to say is I do not wish, uh, so I don't think that we should be, uh, safeguarding the discursive golden middle, uh, because it will ultimately boil down to business as usual rhetoric. This is something we're already seeing that that logic is not succeeding. Um, what we need to learn from far-right ecologism for the future is that the moral panics, which we tend to react and the obsession with exposing and unmasking something where someone, uh, is not actually conducive to achieving the social change. Um, and what I've, what I see and as I mentioned that in the future is that certain contexts, uh, in certain contexts, such as those that have been conducting, researching, uh, Hungary, Poland, where you have 60% of the population voting for right-wing populists or, uh, other far-right parties, there's no way on earth that you can possibly ignore these actors. Um, So there's no way that you can just point your finger and say, I'm not talking to these people, uh, or the people who vote them, or you can of course not talk to the proponents, but the voters you have to. So the debate is not only pertaining to the environmental domain I believe. Uh, it is that question of, uh, deliberative democracy points to these broader issues that we're having. Uh, because I feel that we're ending up in a situation where who speaks the louder is, uh, the winner of the conversation. And somehow I do not like that scenario. So, uh, it is, I find it in, uh, I think it's a general remark, which is in my deepest convictions, a valid one. AD: No, I, and I think that's a great point to end on of how we ignore these actors at our peril. And if we don't understand the origins and the issues that these far-right groups are really rallying around, we are not able to engage and have a democracy, as you said. So, Balsa thanks for being here and for people that want to find you or research and learn more about you, are you on social media? Where can they connect with you? BL: Yes. Uh, they can find me on Twitter. Um, that's where I'm somewhat active, not as much, uh, but, uh, it's easy to reach me, uh, otherwise, um, just look up on the CARR website and find my, uh, profile and there's my email. And you can reach out to me without any problems. I will be happy to respond and engage to the best of my ability. AD: Thank you for being here and joining us today. BL: Thank you very much. AD: Thanks for joining us for Right Rising a podcast from the Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right. See you next time.