Augusta DellÕOmo: Welcome to Right Rising a podcast from the Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right. I'm your host Augusta DellÕOmo. Today, I'm joined by Dr. Mario Peucker, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Industries and Livable Cities, at Victoria University in Australia. He's here with us today to give us an overview of the radical right in Australia. Mario, thanks for being here. Mario Peucker: Thanks for having me. AD: So I wanted to start with Mario really drawing on your experience as a researcher, working in Australia Š for most of our researchers and fellows and people based in the United States and Europe. They're not as familiar with the far right in Australia. So what spurred the recent growth of the radical right in Australia? MP: Okay. Maybe, um, to begin with a very brief, um, context. Uh, I'm not a historian, but I looked at, um, the history of the radical right in Australia. And it has been a very long history, um, since the 1920s, at least. And then there were groups that emerged, um, immediately after World War II and it continued that. So they popped up and disappeared again. Um, but, uh, in contrast to what we've seen in, in other parts of the Western world, um, those groups have never really received a lot of friction or attention. There were a few exceptions in that in the late 1980s and 1990s, we saw some violent escalations, um, fire bombings of uh, Asian restaurants, in parts of Australia, but it has always remained, um, under the radar, not much public attention, not much political attention, so not much academic attention, but that has changed significantly in the mid or early 2010s. Um, the global context was, uh, sort of. ISIS was dominating the public headlines. So it was all about, um, Islam as a threat, moral panic around Islam, domestic, the threat of domestic attacks, uh, which we've seen in Europe, but then also to some extent, smaller extent in Australia itself. Um, so there was a sense of fear and panic around the case of Islam in Western societies, obviously embedded in this broader War on Terror that we've seen often 9/11. This was, um, a catalyst and very fertile ground for the emergence of, um, the new radical right. Um, There was a, uh, an incident in 2014 in Sydney, where um, it was considered an act of domestic, um, Islamic jihadist terrorism. Um, with a few people killed four people got killed. Um, The Lindt Cafe Siege, it was, um, commonly referred to that was a big catalyst specific catalyst for, um, groups to emerge. So the, the, the trigger was an anti-Islamic, um, climate. Um, then there were a few regional, um, incidents, uh, mosque application in a small regional town in Victoria, which is a state in the southeast of Australia. Um, also became some kind of, um, rallying ground for new emerging far-right groups. So initially it was all about, um, pushing an anti-Islam agenda. Although this was for many groups, just the smoke screen and, uh, an opportunity to push the, a much broader agenda. AD: And I think your last point about the use of anti-Islamic rhetoric is very important, particularly, as you said in the Australian context, but let's get a little bit into the broader agenda of these groups. What kinds of narratives and issues have the radical right use in the past in Australia? And, as you pointed out, there's been this surge in activity in the 2010s. Have there been any changes in the kinds of issues and arguments and narratives that they've been pushing? MP: There have been lots of changes in the last five to, going on five, six, seven years. So initially it was all about being anti-Islam, anti-Muslim communities, but it's very soon turned out that this was for many groups, just, uh, an opportunity to push an agenda. And even in the, in the mid 2010s, there were some groups that were already in existence a little bit longer that were not comfortable with this focus on anti-Islam. They said, that we are not only um, against Islam in Australia, much, our agenda is much broader. It's white supremacy, it's ignored national state. So we don't agree with what they say, multiculturalism minus Islam. So, initially there was a big debate about this, but then as this moral panic in the public, um, hysteria around Islam slowly decline in it's obviously it's never really left us, unfortunately, but, um, it declined. And then those groups that had emerged in the 2010s, they were looking for either looking for new opportunities to mobilize or show their true face, basically. Um, they've always been very responsive to, um, what we called it discursive opportunities that popped up. So in 2017, for example, there was a marriage equality debate in Australia. So they jumped on that bandwagon and pushed the very anti- agenda that opposed gender diversity or identity and debates. Um, so that was one of the issues seems, the same sex marriage debate was becoming quite big. And then, um, there were issues around supposedly if African game crimes that became a big topic, also triggered by incidents that happened in Melbourne in 2016, 17, and then 18 again. So it's important for us to, um, to emphasize it they have been very opportunistic in terms of what topics and what narratives they want to push. And it changes very quickly. But generally speaking, there has been a shift away from a narrow anti-Islam agenda to a much more openly racist, white supremacy and anti-Semitic um, um, agenda or narratives. These have become, these agendas have become much more prevalent. Um, That's happened before the 2019 Christchurch terror attack. And it was intensified after that. Um, So there's a shift away from anti-Islam and another big topic has been being anti-government. This is something that comes up, especially at the moment, again, in the context of, um, COVID-19 restrictions. So the government is becoming the enemy. Generally speaking, the narratives have moved away from targeting individual groups to, um, targeting bigger systems like in the New World Order, the globalist elites. It's moving into a much broader idea of what we should call, um, agenda that weÕve seen most recently also with the rise of, um, Sovereign Citizens. That is really something that is happening. AD: I think that last point Mario is incredibly important. And I, I think what you just said really captured how flexible these groups are. I think at times, uh, as scholars and even as just viewers of television, we think that these groups haven't changed at all. And in reality, theyÕre quite flexible and quite able to adapt and pull on other issues to push a broader, more and more racist, more explicitly racist, more explicitly nationalist agenda. You mentioned one point about their relationship to the Australian government that I thought was really interesting. Coming from the United States context, one of the most challenging things for scholars working on this issue, is how much Donald Trump specifically, and other members of the Republican party have really started using and pulling from white nationalists and white supremacist groups, rhetoric, and material. So I wanted to ask, if you could go a little bit further into the relationship between what we would call the radical right in the mainstream right in Australia? MP: Yeah. It's very complicated. Obviously the context is different in Australia, in that sense. It's not so different. We also have a conservative government and we've had one for quite some time. Um, but there is not much support for that government. So it's the general ideological mindset that is anti-, um, well, very anti-democracy, actually in many parts of the radical right. Makes it almost impossible for most groups to be pro-government. That doesn't mean that they are opposed to every government decision and every policy. So I remember in 2016 or 17, there was a rally organized by, um, parental rights groups in Melbourne that was actually in support of the government, um, refugee policy. Uh, so this is something that we don't see very often, at least not in, in Europe, in, in, in, um, in Australia, thatÕs radical right group mobilize in favor um, or in support of government policies, but generally speaking, the government is seen as the part of the enemy. And this is, um, specifically the case in those States. So it's a state specific issue often that are not conservative governments have been seen as Marxist socialists, communists. They're just normal social Democrats basically. AD: Thanks for that. And, um, you know, the context that you pointed out of the various state governments, how that impacts the radical rightÕs organizing, and the kinds of issues that they focus on. So for those of us who are not as familiar with Australia's government, systems, you know, how they set up their local versus federal government. Are there any geographical hotspots where the radical right is particularly vocal in Australia? MP: So Australia is, is as you, as you mentioned, uh, um, uh, federal states or similar to the US, um, states have a lot of their own character and one of the and their own reputation in a way. So the most progressive, um, state at the moment is Victoria. This is where Melbourne is. Um, and although we don't have really a reliable data, that would allow it like a really robust and answer to the question of geographically hot spots. So it's hard to say, but Melbourne and Victoria in general has been described as the capital of the radical right. Um, there was a newspaper, a few um, I think it was in early 2019 after a big rally in Melbourne. Um, and the big question was why does it always happen in Melbourne? It's true that those protests predominantly happened have happened in Melbourne and in Victoria more generally, but mostly Melbourne. Um, but just because those publicly visible actions, um, occur primarily in Melbourne, doesn't mean that nobody is necessarily a hotspot. So I'm not saying it's not. Um, but from different related surveys, we know that when you look at attitude surveys, for example, they show that other parts of the country is have way more racist attitudes are way more prevalent in other parts of the country in Queensland, which is in the northeast. In New South Wales, which is Sydney sits, and most other states are more conservative in terms of, um, mainstream views and mainstream racist, racist views in the mainstream. So it's difficult to say whether they are depending on how you define hotspots. I guess their activity level is particularly high in Melbourne and in Victoria and our assessment is that this is not despite its progressive nature of the state, but because of the progressive nature. So the enemies even more clearly defined in a state that is progressive. Um, it reminds me a bit of Portland as well, or the AD: Yeah, I was just going to say, when you were saying that it completely reminded me of Portland in the Pacific Northwest, in the United States. MP: I guess the difference is, there are many differences, but one of the difference is that Portland, as far as I know, and I'm not an expert in US um, geography and demographics, but it's a relatively, um, white state, whereas Victoria is a very multicultural state. I mean, one of the most, I think the most multicultural state maybe. AD: Yeah, yeah. Portland is Portland is extremely white. Yeah. Well, and I think this gets to your, your point that you made about in the case of Melbourne, it's the cosmopolitan and diversity of the city that breeds that reactionary, racist response. Versus in Portland, there's a long history of, um, since the twenties and thirties groups, seeing the Pacific Northwest is a haven for, for white people to form their own separate state. So, you know, there's all of these complexities and these different groups that are all part of this umbrella of what we would call the radical right. But, each has different motivations and, uh, drivers and arguments that it's very important to think about the local context, not just the people that you see on TV. Um, so I guess that leads me to my next question for you, Mario, which for those of us who are not in Australia, who would you say are the major players that you see operating in your radical right landscape? MP: So the first thing that is important to notice that it's not very well organized. Um, so there are not many um, clearly defined and, uh, publicly visible or even, none publicly or in otherwise visible groups that used to be different in the mid 2010s when, when the new radical rights sort of emerged. And we hit the anti-Islam group called Reclaim Australia, which was very dominant and hit a very big number of followers online. And they mobilized quite a few people that release then a, splinter a group called United Patriots Front. Um, Another splinter group which followed True Blue Crew, Soldiers of Odin. Um, these groups have all either be completely disappeared or have become very sort of, um, dormant in a way. Um, it's probably worth mentioning that the United Patriot Front was and has been a key player and was led by Blair Cottrell who, um, referred to as emperor by the Christchurch terrorist Brenton Tarrant. But these groups, as I said, they've all sort of, um, become defunct and gone then we have apart from those, those groups did now have disappeared we have, um, a few political parties on the fringe. Um, one of them, which I would describe as right-wing populist party for Fraser AnningÕs National Party Party. She has a few seats in Parliament. Um, Then there are many other very sort of fringe political parties that you've never had any chance to be, um, you know, play any role in the elections, any significant role. So apart from those parties, we have a few groups and mainly sort of networks between groups. So groups that I could, for example, mention there, the Proud Boys, a spinoff of the American version of the Proud Boys. Um, but most actors, the key players are not organized. It's a leaderless movement primarily based on networks. Um, so I think that the groups or the individuals want to push the radical right agenda, they have realized that groups, formal groups don't really work in Australia. So they have most recently, um, moved to develop, um, more informal networks, which includes, um, you know, individuals that just personally associate themselves, but also previous groups, um, efforts onto that, um, Lad Society, which is a men's club, a bit more political and a bit more radical than the Proud Boys, because the Lad Society push an openly nationalistic, um, approach, agenda. They've recently merged with more openly fascist groups, um, Neo-Nazi, or Nazi groups that call themselves the National Socialist, Network and behalf of the Australian House of Nationalists. So these are the main groups. And then on the fringes we have groups like, um, Southern Cross Hammerskins and Combat 18, who like skinhead groups that don't really play a significant role that do not do much. Um, so they're are sort of falling apart, but the main point, I think you said it's based on networks, Um, and personally like people who are personally associating themselves with mostly networks. MP: Yeah. And I, that point about the personal informal networks that exist in the radical right, is extremely important, especially as someone who studies this, and as I'm sure you've run into, it can be very difficult to track membership in these groups because the groups are constantly evolving, they're constantly reforming and you'll have people that are members of three or four different extremist organizations. So, and they do this to make themselves seem bigger more substantial and more powerful than they actually are, which can make it really difficult to track and accurately measure where these groups are organizing, how they're doing it, who the members are. Um, and I think that that's an absolutely critical context for us when we're thinking about the radical, right. You've mentioned a few times the Christchurch terror attacks. Um, so I wanted to ask you specifically, if you could briefly for people who are not familiar, explain the Christchurch terror attacks in 2019, which were committed by an Australian right-wing extremist. And then talk to us a little bit about how this has affected the radical right in Australia. MP: Okay. So the Christchurch terror attacks, I think we can refer to it as, um, right, extreme right right or radical right right terror because the perpetrator himself admitted that it was meant to be a terror. So until recently, I always had to say alleged terror, which he hadnÕt admitted but now he has been convicted, was perpetrated by a man named Brenton Tarrant who grew up in a regional town in New South Wales, which is a state for Sydney is the capital of, um, he left Australia a few years back and traveled through Europe. Um, and that's where he, um, well, I don't want to go into the details how he radicalized, but I mean, he, he talks about that manifesto that is called the Great Replacement and that he published, um, at the time of his, his, um, terror escapades in, um, last year in 2019, 2019, um, he, he killed 51 people. Um, all of them Muslims in an attack on two mosques in Christchurch in New Zealand. So there was a bit of a debate. Is this, um, how this affects Australian response and awareness of right wing terror. Some people didn't want to see him as Australian because he hadn't lived in Australia for a few years and it happened in New Zealand. Um, but he, he was, um, Australia and that's why, um, probably reasoned by it affected the discussion, um, the political and public debate in Australia. So, um, but it obviously also affected the way, um, the radical right in Australia, saw themselves in how it developed. And it has often been described as an absolute game changer for the radical right or for the debate around them. But I would not say that it was a game changer. It was not a complete change of directions when it happened in 2019. We would rather say that it's it reinforced the attacks, reinforced developments that we had already seen prior to their antics. We finished this study just before the attacks happened and so we submit the report in, in, um, in late 2018, just a few months before the attacks. And what we said in that report is that you've seen a, um, development of contraction among the far right. So there's often that debate it's growing. I'm not even sure whether it's growing in terms of numbers, um, the radical rights movement, um, was seen in Australia. I'm not sure where they'd score. Maybe it's growing again now, but back then it was rather contracting into more radical and smaller cells. Um, so it's related to what I said before, the falling effect of those, you know, more organized groups. Um, initially the radical right tried to become a miss movement and there were moments when you thought they could actually, um, sort of get a bit of momentum and, um, turn into a mass movement. But then the numbers at the protests declined and declined. The decline in the numbers of the counter-protests increased and increased. So it was hard to maintain that that's that narrative that they are sort of the silent majority. So they changed directions and strategy, and I'm not sure how strategic that was and how deliberate it was, but it was certainly something that played out in the real world. Um, they moved away from mass mobilizations attempts and contracted in smaller groups where they all knew each other people knew each other. Um, recruitment happened on a personal level not via Facebook anymore, um, so that was a development that we saw prior to the Christchurch attacks and the Christchurch attacks reinforced that development in our views and various reasons. One reason was that people who were sort of on the fringes of those, um, groups and ideologies they were forced to confirm the decision whether they want to be part of something that could lead or could be associated with the killing of 51 people. So many people just decided that this is all going to too far and probably, um, jumped off this, this movement, but those who stayed were more committed. It was that's our, our scene. So when I said before, that is a shift towards openly racist and white supremacist narratives. That's probably also because those who were more on the fringes of those groups, the movement, or have to become less involved. The second reason why it contracted was of, um, the social media crackdown on many, um, you know, radical right websites or, um, pages on Facebook and Twitter on those mainstream social media platforms. So those people who decided to remain active online, they move to more fringe or tech platforms. Um, we have, for example, seen an increase in the number of, um, members on Gab in the subgroup Australia, um, from about 3,000 when the Christchurch attack happened to around 11,000 in just a few months. So it skyrocketed and, um, it shows that obviously not all of them are Australians, but there is certainly an increase in Australian radical right, um, associated individuals who went to those more radical websites and on to that are more of an echo chamber, even then their previous Facebook pages. So that's also changed the way narratives and ideologies are reinforced and aggravated within those groups and leads to, uh, a further radicalization process amongst them. So I think this then also 8chan has been taken down or has migrated to, um, sort of the dark net. Um, it has also probably fueled, uh, a more radical or more extremist part of the radical right within the Australian debate. And they've always been well connected internationally. So those 8chan, the closures of 8chan could have had an effect on them. AD: And I think the point that you just made there highlights one of the great dilemmas of how do you combat extreme right-wing activity online? By de platforming them in many cases, like you said, perhaps the less committed members drop off, but the more extreme members just reinforce and form more, smaller, more tight knit group and migrate to a difficult area that of the internet that's even more challenging to regulate. So I think that tension, that's the big question that we, I think as scholars and policymakers really faces, how do you actually occur extreme right-wing activity on the internet? MP: And then the question is what, what the objective is. If you want to avoid this, um, you know, mass mass contribution of, of ideologies into the broader mainstream, then de-platforming is certainly a very important element of it. And, um, One of the, the main, um, groups that were active in 2015, 16, the United Patriots Front, they blamed the crackdown on their Facebook page for, for their crumbling. So it's a good sign when people like people at the center of it, of the radical, right say these things, but then at the same time, if you're, if your objective is to avoid violent, um, violent escalation, then those de-platforming attempts may be counterproductive in a sense because you drive people underground and you know, that the risk is, is, is in other places of the world, or is that there are individuals who um, just take it one step further basically, and commit violence. So the question of the de-platforming, revolves around what the objective is really. AD: Yeah. I completely agree with you. And it also, for many of these groups had they've not become transnational, right? They take inspiration from all these different places and there's different regulations in all of these different places. And there's so many ways to circumvent regulation now that, like you said, it's, it's getting a larger existential question of what do you actually think that you can reasonably do to curb the violence of, of these groups? So, Mario, thank you for being here with us today. And uh, where can people read more about what you've been writing? Are you on, are you on social media? Can they find you on Twitter? Where can our listeners read more of your work? MP: Um, you can, you can find more about my publications on the CARR website, on Research Gate and Academia. AD: Mario, thank you again for, for being with us today. MP: Thank you very much. AD: Thank you for joining us for another episode of Right Rising, a podcast from the Center for the Analysis of the Rdical Right. See you next time.