Augusta DellÕOmo: Welcome to Right Rising a podcast from the Center for Analysis of the Radical Right. I'm your host Augusta DellÕOmo. Today I'm joined by Blyth Crawford and Florence Keen, who are both doctoral candidates in War Studies at King's College, London and research fellows at the International Center for the Study of Radicalization. They are here with us today to talk about Chan culture and how it relates to far-right violence. Blyth and Florence, thanks for being here. 
Blyth Crawford: Thanks for having us. 
Florence Keen: Hi. Thanks. Excited to be here today. 
AD: Great. I wanted to just start off with the big question, which is about Chan culture itself. So could you go talk to us about what is Chan culture and why is studying it important?
BC: Yes. So basically Chan sites are a cluster of image board forums, um, each with their own sort of subsection of individual boards where users can talk to each other about a range of topics, usually general interest topics. Um, they really differ from mainstream social media, largely in the fact that they're almost entirely anonymous, you operate without a photo or a name, which is really unlike Facebook or Twitter or anything like that for you're encouraged to really pour your personality into your social media right? Uh, a lot of them have been created as a sort of antithesis to mainstream social media as well. Um, so they want to go against sort of big tech moderation or what they perceive that to be. Um, and be really counter-cultural in a way, a lot of them are sort of created in the image of BBS systems, which are, you know, ways that people use to communicate in this sort of early ages of the internet. And they kind of have their own culture in a way that mainstream social media platforms don't really have their own culture. 
Um, in terms of why they're so important to study, like, I guess that's something that we're going to talk about for the entire podcast, really, but Chans like 4chan and 8chan, which are the largest sort of Western facing Chans, really influenced so much of social media culture. A lot of the memes that we all know today have come from 4chan of trickle down into mainstream social media. And in terms of studying extremism or far-right violence, they have a really ambivalent relationship to that in that they've always had um, incidence of violence, which has been linked to Chan cultures, even though a lot of what happens on Chan sites is not directly to do with politics or even violence, but they've been tied to, um, school shootings and some instances of incel violence. And most recently we saw this big string of far-right terrorism attacks being linked to 8chan before its closure, starting with the Christchurch shooting in 2019, by Brenton Tarrant where he post his manifesto and a live stream to 8chan. And that was emulated by a number of shooters have been tied to various other Chan's sites. So they represent a really sort of interesting facet of internet culture, which is becoming really influential in studies of online radicalization. 
FK: Um, and I was just kind of adding on the back of that kind of why question, why is it so important? Um, not only do we see this kind of specific connection to a number of far right attacks, but it's also this general trivialization and glorification of violence that exists within these kind of online Chan cultures. And so what we were really trying to discern is. How this works in relation to their visual culture, primarily through the memes in which key is such an important aspect here. Um, and in this regard, really trying to understand how they lower the barrier for participation into that kind of more extreme ideology that we find online. 
AD: Thank you both for that, that overview. And I thought it was really interesting, like what you said about how it's an, it's an earlier form almost of the internet, right? Like these early publishing forums and message boards where you're anonymous and they create that anonymity. But when we think about programs like, or platforms like Instagram or Facebook, you know, they want you to personalize and make it about you as much as possible. So that's a really interesting, you know, switch and how the Chan boards operate. And Florence, I just wanted to ask, and if you could continue with what you were discussing with memes and visual culture, how does that contribute to violence and serve the broader agenda of the far, right - especially when you think about. I liked the phrase that you use it, this lowered barrier to entry?
FK: Absolutely. I mean, one of the key findings that we found, um, within our dataset, um, as part of this wider report, is that a lot of the most prominent memes that we see deployed have real kind of malleable meanings, which means that violence may be promoted in really subtle ways, and not necessarily that obvious to those who aren't, you know, embedded within meme and Chan culture itself. So, you know, popular memes that might seem very innocuous. Um, you know, for example, a version of the Pepe the Frog meme, um, may then be placed in a certain context, um, as some of our report goes into, and then it takes on a much, um, maybe deeper meaning often really connected to a more kind of bigoted, racist, misogynistic, et cetera, worldview. And so in that regard, it memes a very important with regards to the visual aesthetic that they really ferment, um, and what we saw as them becoming very kind of fundamental in cementing, a certain kind of in-group status, um, which often really hides the true meaning of that means to less familiar observers.
Um, And when weÕre talking about in group and particularly in Chan cultures, that's not to say that there's one specific organization or kind of tangible structure, but more this kind of coalescing of individuals and movements, um, that really cluster around a variety of far right ideologies and philosophies, um, which makes it really tricky to kind of pin down in this. You know, particularly kind of nebulous in its nature. 
BC: Yeah. I think just to build on that as well, um, there's something specific in the vehicle of a meme, um, which makes them so useful to Chan culture and to the far-right more broadly, um, which is in, you know, it sounds kind of stupid to talk about memes as tool of political ideology. Right? But that's part of where their power really comes from. Um, and that is sort of inherent deniability in that, um, you see a funny image and you can convey a really hateful concept, but at the same time, you can suggest that, you know, you're just messing around with the internet. It doesn't really mean anything serious. And to have that sort of ability to influence a slow creep of ideology through humor, that's a really useful tool for the far right to spread, um, sort of hate into more mainstream audiences starting with Chan culture, maybe spreading on to more mainstream social media as well.
AD: That's so fascinating. And would you both say in your opinion that the way that they're using memes, you know, one of the things that we talked about on Chan sites is in some ways they're organic, right? It's because of the anonymity, people just kind of post and things can take on a life of their own and there's no regulation, but do you see these, the generation of memes as part of a larger effort by the far right to sort of influenced the mainstream, like you both have said with needs having a lower barrier to entry, people think they're funny. Is that a tangible choice by the far right? Or is this just something that has organically come out of the culture of chance sites? 
BC: I think it's a little bit of both. I think it's partly sort of preaching to the converted, you know, and sharing these funny images, as Florence was saying, does build in group that sort of happens quite organically. And people communicate, um, in a group that feel really comfortable with using memes as a vehicle for humor, but something that has always been part of Chan cultures and that we actually saw in our own ethnography as part of this project was people consciously choosing to do what they're calling meme campaigns, which is where, um, they choose a target. In this case, it was something called Operation Pride Fall, where they targeted smaller companies who were endorsing Pride Month, um, in the UK and the US and sort of try to target them in social media, with memes, which spread disinformation about the LGBT community and spreading hate through, you know, what they would call, you know, funny images. And so that was a really conscious choice to use memes as a tool to spread this information into the mainstream. So there is some awareness that a meme isn't entirely politically neutral. 
AD: How would you both categorize their relationship to the mainstream? Both in terms of how Chan's differ from other social media sites, but also what are the users hoping to get out of being part of this community?
BC: So they have a really ambivalent relationship to the mainstream, basically. Right. As I was saying, sort of at the start, um, and a lot of ways, Chans sites market themselves as an antithesis to mainstream social media and to mainstream culture in general. And they really want to exist as this counter-cultural space. And so they do lots of things to distance and distance themselves from Facebook and Twitter and sites like that in particular, and really mock users of, um, the sites and mock, you know, conservative and liberal voters, as well as just being normies or participating in normal culture, which they see as something really pointless and boring basically. But there's also part of Chan culture, which is a real feeder into the mainstream as we've been talking about. Um, and it really influences mainstream culture. I think what people get out of this, and at least some small part is this feeling of elitism and feeling that you have, firstly a distance from mainstream culture, but also a sort of superiority to it and the ability to influence it as well. And that, as Florence was talking about is really important for creating in group and feeling part of something quite special. 
FK: Yeah. And just to kind of add to that, um, you know, It kind of means the lessons that we learn from moderating or regulating mainstream social media, um, really can't be easily applied to Chan culture just because they operate in such different way, right? I mean, um, what we see is this entrenched anonymity, a real kind of lax approach to moderation, um, and this very kind of hostile attitude towards, you know, so-called outsiders and normies, meaning that the objective of, you know, spending time on Chans um, isn't necessarily to even engage with large audiences, um, which I guess has implications on the way, which may we may attempt to kind of engage with that culture or even moderate on it, um, which we can come in some more detail later on.
AD: Fantastic. I mean, that's, that's such a helpful explanation, I think for people, because in many cases, for people that are, have never been on a Chan site, it seems as if it's kind of a nebulous far off place, right? Like it's 4chan, itÕs the dark web, right? Like it can feel very foreign to people who are not, who've never been on these sites. They don't understand how they're constructed. And it's really interesting, the point that both of you brought up about that it gives the users a sense of elitist when the entire premise of how the platform is constructed is, you know, everybody's anonymous. You're just one part of this group. And so that's a really interesting contradiction.
FK: Yeah. I think it is really that sense of feeling part of something that seems cool basically. And I think Chans really build that, um, sense of community. I think something that you were saying Augusta about, sort of seeing 4chan and 8chan like horrible places on the dark web. I think we're seeing something really interesting with QAnon there where, you know, the QAnon conspiracy started on 4chan. Um, and now 8kun , which was formerly 8chan is sort of the home of where these Q drops or updates from, um, the sort of shady Q figure coming from. Although a lot of people who are participating in the conspiracy theory are sort of saying to avoid 8chan at all costs and avoid 8kun because it's this horrible dark place where, you know, Nazis use the internet. Um, and it's only really safe to engage with the conspiracy on mainstream social media. So we're seeing that while it's sort of seen as a really cool place to be for people who are really embedded in Chan culture. If you're not familiar with it, it does seem something kind of scary. And I think that people who are familiar with Chan culture like that, they have that sort of reputation as the edgy kid on the internet.
AD: Florence, I wanted to go back to something that you mentioned earlier about the challenges with how Chan culture works and how the actual platform of Chan sites makes it difficult to use traditional or not traditional, but steps that, social media companies have increasingly sought to rely on like moderators or de-platforming. So are there any policy steps that could be productive to curb the potential for online radicalization on these Chans? Um, and what role could the de-platforming realistically play? 
FK: Yeah, the de-platforming debate is really, really interesting when we think about Chans. Um, you know, we've seen great examples of mainstream social media companies, uh, really making efforts to kind of get rid of bad actors or bad organizations and actually really stemming the flow of hate. Um, but it's, it's just, it's just very different worlds. Um, when we think about Chans and I think 8chan, um, and its removal from the Clearnet is, is an interesting case study of what can actually happen in practice when it's like gets taken down. Um, and in this instance, we saw the private sector really moving ahead to kind of pull the plug on its operations, um, CloudFare being that service provider. So, you know, in the wake of that string of far-right attacks that happened in 2019, um, they stopped their ability to operate. And of course 8chan went offline for a couple of months. Um, but then came back in November 2019 under the guise of 8kun, um, which had the same owner and visually the site was very similar where they actually, you know, almost a year into its operation, we do see some kind of differences in terms of the content and some of those sort of tactical factors. But I think the point is that when one of these kinds of sites gets taken down. We do see the flow of users moving to even more niche Chans. Um, and also other kinds of popular apps like Telegram and Discord. So it's relatively hard in these kinds of more niche spaces to stop the overall flow. Um, and this idea that simply kind of de-platforming or attempting to engage in moderation doesn't necessarily easy apply. 
Um, and other things that we also observed is that we know that some Chans are actually kind of preemptively seeking to, um, retain their most popular boards by, you know, forging alliances with other Chans, um, really preemptively against the removal of, um, their operations on the Clearnet. Um, and in that case, even, you know, the ability to go to the dark net is still a possibility. So I think our kind of takeaways are that, you know, really engaging with Chan culture, um, should be treated with caution and not simply just replicating the de-platforming lessons with mainstream social media, which, you know, in some instances have proven to be successful. Um, and it's just kind of understanding that awareness of, you know, what the consent means becoming really kind of, you know, conscious of, of the subtext behind what we find on Chans and just aware that simply closing one space down will often have knock on effects, um, and you know, the importance of kind of mapping why that flow goes.
AD: That's so that's helpful to draw that distinction because I think one of the, the challenges, when we talk about de-platforming, especially in the context of Chan sites is the process of de-platforming actually in some ways reinforces and the most devoted advocates to these far right ideologies, these Chan cultures that the threat against them is real, right? That they thrive on creating this culture of we're we're being oppressed by the government. They're out to get us. And then de-platforming reinforces that in their mind. And in some ways strengthens that, that small in-group that goes with them for each of these sites. So that's a, it's a really helpful way of looking at the problems of what happens when you de-platform them, where do they go next? And then our challenge is researchers is trying to track them and track their users to these, these different platforms that can be even more difficult to access. From your research, how have Chan sites responded to current events specifically like the Black Lives Matter movement beginning in the US but is now really global, global movement and the COVID-19 crisis? And what can we learn from this response? 
BC: The, the period of time that we were collecting data, you know, coincided with this, you know, extremely turbulent year. And it wasn't something we expected when we went into this project, you know, earlier on in January. So of course, you know, COVID-19 and Black Lives Matter um, have really kind of increased the amount of time people have spent online and the promotion of, um, specific conspiracy theories. Um, so I'll, I'll speak for the Black Lives Matter movement where we really saw the deployment of means targeted at Black people in an attempt to dehumanize and really de-legitimized their cause. Um, in which, you know, we really saw these kinds of very old racist tropes that, um, held really offensive comparisons of Black people, um, to animals, you know, for example, implying they lack self-control, um, you know, trying to associate them or perpetuate the myth of Black people and particularly men with criminality. Um, and often these images juxtapose with, you know, the idea of white people as brave and strong. Um, uh, particularly in relation to George Floyd's death, um, we came across really graphic images that were amongst the most popular shared memes within our dataset. Um, and actually these were sort of deemed too offensive to even share. Um, but what it really shows is this kind of casual and mocking approach to the death of a Black person in which a certain subset of the community viewed Black lives as disposable. Um, and really that kind of violence inflicted against them as something that was kind of comical and funny. 
FK: Yeah, I think to build on that with coronavirus, we did see a really similar response. I think, uh, in that it took over a lot of discussion on a lot of the Chans that we were looking at, and it became a real focus for just information and conspiracy theories. Um, and generally reveling in the chaos that coronavirus brought around the world. Um, I would say that there wasn't so much of a uniform response across Chan sites, as there was a general clamoring and reveling in panic and chaos. I think that was something that we can really learn from how Chans have related to 2020 as a year as a whole really is that, um, the bigger the opportunity that they're given to um, - sorry I'll say that again - and that they really take um, big political events as opportunities. And they look at them as something to be capitalized upon, to spread, um, chaos and panic into the mainstream. And they see them as almost a fun thing to be enjoyed really. And it's that reveling and chaos, which is so central to them. 
I think something else that we haven't touched on, but it's really important to Chans is that the response to both, um, Black Lives Matter and coronavirus. Both were really infused with anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories that often, um, labeled Jews as you know, the sort of orchestrators of evil. And I think that it's that sort of taking joy in panic and mocking people for being scared and that sort of level of anti-Semitism that were two big findings that we found from the data that we were looking out throughout 2020. 
BC: Yeah. And I think, I mean, this is really just a big finding that's one to watch because clearly the world is continuing to go on this kind of trajectory of instability. You know, tensions relating to upcoming US elections, you know, economic problems in most countries in the world, um, continuing pandemic. And then these kinds of racial tensions on the back of this, um, means that it's a space that we have to continue to watch on Chan cultures to see the ways in which users may be seeking to manipulate the instability to their own ends.
AD: One last thing that I wanted to ask you both is how do you actually conduct this research right? Like what is the process that you created to track these memes? And then what key findings can you, can you share with us that we haven't already touched on from this study that you both have been working on?
FK: So this was like a really kind of mixed method approach. Um, combining data effort with a data scientist where we essentially kind of collecting information across, uh, various boards over a number of key Chan sites. Um, specifically the sites with a Ō/pol/Ķ politically incorrect or equivalent board, um, as well as some of the Weapons boards, um, over several months. Um, and within that, we were able to determine the most popular memes and images that were shared on these Chan sites, as well as the reach between them and then conducted ethnographic analysis on how these were contributing to, or situating themselves within violent discourse. Um, and then alongside this, we also conducted a number of key interviews with, um, experts from government, academia, and the private sector, just to make sure we got a really good sense of kind of what was going on in Chan culture and how the kind of visuals and content were contributing to, um, promoting violence.
BC: Yeah. And just to touch on some of the key findings, um, from our analysis, we found that there is sort of a difference between images that were shared on Chans, which just looking at them, you could say we're inherently hateful. There were some which, um, no matter how, whatever way you spin it, basically we're just conveying hateful concepts. Whereas there are others, as Florence has touched upon already, which had more malleable meanings, um, and really seemed quite innocuous when you first looked at them, but situated within, um, context of other posts and in broader discussion took on quite a hateful meaning. Um, we also found that there was a real difference between images that we saw, um, that were popular within Chan sites themselves and between Chan sites. So the memes that we saw having the greatest spread between Chan platforms. And these really tended to be I guess longer memes which contained at times pages and pages of text. So it sort of problematized what we were thinking of as a meme, as being, you know, just an image or an image with a few words or a tagline underneath it. And we've sort of determined that sometimes images are used not just as pure images, but to convey really dense ideological concepts. And at times to share really important texts with each otherÕs as well. So it is about, um, looking beyond just memes as something funny or humorous, although that is a really important part of how they're used by the far right, but to really looking at them as a vehicle for ideological, um, information as well. 
AD: Well, thank you so much Blyth and Florence for joining us today and lending your expertise about Chan culture to really help us ground ourselves when we're hearing all of this mainstream conversation about Chan culture, I feel like I'm now more informed about what's going on in these boards. Where can our listeners read more from you, hear more from you, find out about this study, um, whether that's on your academic platforms or, or social media. 
FK: Yeah. So the study should be published soon. It was actually funded by the Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats as known as CREST, which is an independent center commissioned by the ESRC. So our larger report should be coming out via CREST, but we also have a kind of series of shorter outputs as well. Um, which. You'll be able to find, um, on GNET. Um, and I also believe some coming out on CARRÕs website as well. Um, so we'll kind of keep you looking out for that. And of course, our kinds of Twitter platforms, mine being my name, which is @FlorenceKeen.
BC: And mine being my name, but backwards, which is @Blyth_Crawford. 
AD: Thank you both so much for joining us today. And this has been another episode of Right Rising. See you all next time.