James Downes 0:07 Welcome to Right Rising. Today for this special episode hosted by the CARR Populism Research Unit. I am your host for today James Downes and I'm a Senior Fellow at CARR and the Head of the Populism Research Unit. On the CARR Right Rising podcast we have previously taken a deep dive for the populism research unit into different populist radical right parties. Firstly, we looked at Western Europe with episodes on Italy and Germany, alongside a recent episode on central Eastern Europe, where we focused on the rise of the radical right in Hungary. Today we're delighted to have with us two renowned experts on the radical right, Dr. Mette Wiggen and Dr. Maureen Eger. Dr. Mette Wiggen is a lecturer in teaching and scholarship in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. Mette is also a senior fellow at CARR and her main research interests focus on neo liberalism, the mainstreaming of radical rights ideas, poverty, precarity and welfare chauvinism. Mette also focuses upon widening participation in higher education, as well as engaging young Europeans in politics and society. Dr. Maureen Eger is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Umea University in Sweden. Maureen's research interests lie broadly in political sociology, with an emphasis on immigration, nationalism and the welfare state. Maureen is also a senior fellow at CARR. Welcome to Right Rising. It's great to have you both on the show! I wanted to start off with an important backdrop question for you both. The fact that many of our listeners on right rising may not be that familiar with the political landscape in Scandinavian politics, or indeed across Scandinavia, or even the different types of radical right parties that we currently see vying for political competition across Scandinavia in a number of countries. So starts off with my first question for you Mette. And the first question is, could you give our listeners a quick rundown about the country case of Norway, for example, who are the main radical right parties or radical right party in the Norwegian context? And secondly, what are the main ideological features on the radical right of Norway? Mette Wiggen 2:13 Thank you, James. The, as you say that the main radical right party in Norway's the progress party, and it will serve as he was founded by a different name in 1973, as a libertarian, anti red tape single issue in a protest party actually copied the name from the Danish party that was created in 72. Norwegian version has never been as radical as the Danish party or the the later Danish people's parties for that sake is it's always been more of moderate. And I think the Scandinavian part is that both the Danish and the Norwegian are probably the most popular or successful, radical right parties in Europe. For the in in Norway, for example, they have been shaping the political agenda, and actually contributed to shift their whole spectrum of parties, and much further to the right than they were before. You know, it's a long time they're talking about they're still, they're also been in a government coalition with the mainstream conservatives, the right party for six years, and a bit between 2013 and 2020. But compared to the radical right parties in Europe, they have been very moderate, not just in comparison to in Denmark and Sweden, Democrats for that sake. So many academics actually disagree with labelling them right for rights, assault. And immigration that's so prominent now. And the most important electoral issue in Norway in the last elections anyway, only became part of their ideology in the late 1980s. The other thing is that this party doesn't have direct links to Nazism or fascism similar to the Danish party. They're different from Sweden, Democrats are better still, you know, they've because we're the party that have any significance furthers to the rights. They have always attracted a lot of extreme right support. And the links of course, between both activists, politicians, to more radical groups. Please also became a professional party very, very early on under the leadership of the guy who took over and then like late late 70s Collie haugan. Aim very successfully to expel most radical members and activists from the party, even MPs, and he always wanted Hate responsibility and power that wanted to be in government that didn't want to be a protest party at all. But it took them about 40 years to be accepted by the other political parties that mainstream in, in national politics there have been in Coalition's on a local level, a level of both with the right and the left much longer. Activists seem to be far too extreme, not because of racism, but because of their economic policy liberalism and the quest for privatising public sector, tax cuts centralization, those were the reasons that's the that they were seen to be radical before the 90s. Really. They also, you know, when it comes to ideology that they have always had this kind of ideological conflict between the two main factions, the libertarian faction that couldn't have ended come late is the more anti immigration and now Well, first of all mystic wing, and they actually call themselves a liberal police People's Party. And I used to be honest, the art was, you know, they they are radical, especially on immigration now. But I find it difficult to see much of a difference between them in terms of, of extremism and and racism than the tourists for example, you know, that they are not worse than the Tories. They're also been very consistent in keeping the program's feel racism and xenophobia. But of course, what politicians say is different from what their manifestos say, for example, more than 10 years ago, now that the leader just stepped down. Now recently CVM she introduced sneak Islamization into the Noida language. And, and also, they're not they have a few con convicted criminals in their ranks. For example, there's an ex MP who has conviction for attacking an asylum seeker. So that's pretty extreme. And then, you know, over the years, they've become more and more anti immigrant and radical in that sense. They also distance themselves from the radical right parties on the continent, not only from from Sweden. But cvms, who was the leader said only a few weeks ago that Pruitt's party doesn't have any sister parties in Europe, she said are unique. And in the past, when I've asked petitions from the progress party, about their from from the US, and now for example, or the Sweden Democrats, they get very upset because they don't have anything to do with them. They're not like that they say, but I think the have become closer. I think they're become much more similar to those parties in Europe, and also much less focused on on the economy and cutbacks and prioritisation than they were. So they have definitely become more populist and welfare chauvinist. ethno pluralist I would say, but they're not anti use has also made a big difference between them. There's something interesting going on that moment because the, the populist, ethno pluralist faction of the party seemed to have won it also led to the to them leaving the government with more than a year ago. It's an they have a new leader called civilis togue. She is a charismatic, populists, evangelists, Christian also been named the Norwegian Trump. She's infinite from us for her spoken there some views on Islam, for example, immigration and integration. There's a lot of focus on costs of welfare, that the cost is an issue and it should not be wasted on on foreign immigrants, but it should be used for the elderly in Norway. Also very much concerned about Norwegian values. And she actually wants said that in Norway, we eat pork and we drink alcohol. So a really crude message there about us and them and that immigrants have to a need to assimilate, to be welcome no room for for any kind of differences there. So that's the that's the progress party but there is another party that has that has been in existence since 2016. Tiny micro party that's called The Alliance that's, that's in the last two months I become quite prominent in the media say they are anti semitic anti establishment anti globalisation. And they have joined forces with on the street with anti vaxxers. And the protest groups Stop Islamization of Norway, as well as the Nordic Resistance Movement. And we haven't seen the Nordic Resistance Movement on the streets in Norway for a couple of years. Really, it was a it was the demonstration. Maybe last year, we just two individuals. So this is new, is also been found that the Alliance has tried to link young people from from from schools from secondary schools, to the Nordic Resistance Movement, and other neo nazi individuals and groups online. And this party, you know, it's something really, it's not new, but it's new that they are in the news. And any, any attention is good attention for them. But yeah, that's it, I think on on the part is in Norway, that's worth mentioning, James Downes 11:22 thank you Mette, a really, really fascinating overview and backdrop of the Norwegian political landscape, regarding the radical right there. And I think what our listeners will find very interesting is you mentioned about the Norwegian progress party, being in a coalition government, for example, and then about how we've got these kind of ideological conflicts. And we've also got these other party, the Alliance and also the Nordic Resistance Movement as well. And so moving on to the Swedish case now to the Swedish political landscape. I was also wondering Maureen if you could give our listeners a quick rundown about the case of Sweden. Again, for example, what are the main radical right parties or party in the Swedish political landscape? And secondly, what are the main ideological features of the radical right in Sweden? Maureen Eger 12:12 I will focus on the Sweden Democrats. I'll refer to it as the SD. Throughout this is considered the main radical right party in Sweden. It was founded in 1988. And as Mette referenced in her description of the Norwegian progress party, SD is largely understood as the political successor of earlier fascist and racist movements in Sweden, very different from the progress party. However, under the leadership of yummy Oh cousin since 2005, st has made concerted efforts to change its image by removing explicitly racist language from its election manifestos and also from political rhetoric. The party has also kicked out members with a pension for Nazi memorabilia. Because like the progress party, they aim to be seen as a serious party capable of being in and even leaving the government leading the government is SD a typical radical right party? Well, much like other parties described as radical right, SD does not call itself a radical right party. Actually, opposition also says the party is not populist either. Instead, SD describes itself as a nationalist party. I would say that its policy stances and rhetoric are consistent with a subtype of nationalism one that's aimed at boundary maintenance. This ideology, which my colleague Dr. Sarah Valdez and I termed Neo nationalism, doesn't seek territorial changes, but instead sees existing national borders national institutions and national sovereignty as threatened from outside forces threatened by immigration, threatened by European political integration, and also cultural and economic globalisation with Dr. Valdez in our previous research, we used almost 50 years of data from the manifesto project to compare the content of Western European party's electoral manifestos over time. Our analyses showed that the policy stances of radical right parties are increasingly consistent with the Neo nationalist ideology. And this is what sets them apart from other party families and also even radical right parties in the 70s 80s and early 90s. Our research also showed that in the 21st century, the average radical right party increasingly articulate support for left wing economic policies, which is a departure from radical Wright's radical right parties, neoliberal stances in the 70s 80s and 90s. So what about st in particular? Well, these general trends for Western Europe are consistent with SDS stated policy preferences and their rhetoric. SD argues that immigrants pose a cultural and criminal threat to Sweden and threat to liberal democracy more generally. sc also describes immigration as a threat to the economic sustainability of the Swedish welfare state, which is a national institution that the party claims it wants to protect. In fact, the direct translation of the cover of sts 2014 election manifesto was, and I'm quoting the translation here, we choose welfare the Sweden Democrats choose welfare before irresponsible mass immigration, comparing sts election manifestos to those of another Swedish radical right party New Democracy that was briefly successful in the early 1990s. makes clear that this type of economic stance isn't just the Swedish thing that characterises all Swedish radical right parties. As these statements are on average left wing while the New Democracy party was very much economically right wing, as these economic policy stances are also more economically left wingers and the Norwegian progress party feel the progress party is not as economically right wing as it was in the 70s 80s or 90s, either. On In a recent interview with the online newspaper, the local focusing said that unlike the Swedish centre right parties that it helps to form a government within the future. SD is not right wing quotes, at least when it comes to economic issues. We like the Swedish welfare model, we'd like to have quite a big state to ensure that people have health care and things like that. And on that we don't agree with the moderates and quotes. However, it's it's clear that SD wants to limit immigrants access to the welfare state, they are a welfare chauvinist Party, which would be a clear departure from the Swedish model, which is based on social democratic principles of universal social rights. Thus, while pro welfare state SD is welfare nationalists, making them again, very different from Sweden's traditional left wing parties. See had its electoral breakthrough in 2010, and has performed even better in both subsequent elections. framing immigrants as a cultural and an economic threat obviously resonates with a much larger proportion of the Swedish population, whereas the explicitly racist arguments did not. So it has not been in government yet. But since 2014, it has been the third largest party in Parliament's Thanks a lot, Maureen. James Downes 17:28 So for our listeners, listening back home. What really strikes me from both the cases that matter and Maureen have just described now of Norway and Sweden, is that we've got, you know, two countries that actually see a very large kind of sizable, or what we could call significant level of support for the radical right. And it got me thinking just now about a famous article published by the renowned scholar, Professor, Jens Rydgren and when it was published in the early 2000s, speaking about how Sweden was an outlier/exceptional case in the sense that there was virtually no level of support for the Swedish Democrats at all. Fast forward 10-15 years, I remember reading about and listening to the about 2018 National parliamentary election in Sweden and how Swedish democrats of course performed so well, what kind of issues like immigration, as you were mentioning more and and kind of this this welfare, chauvinism aspect as well. So again, for our listeners, listening in back home, this really goes to show that, you know, when we talk about the rise of the radical, right, we can see two cases here that really do seem to have large levels of support for the radical right, not just in the last couple of years. But with the Norwegian progress party, I could be also doing well, in the early 2000s. And what also struck me just now was how both parties, you know, the Norwegian progress party, the Swedish Democrats, the SC, they actually seem to, you know, not want to call themselves as kind of radical right parties or kind of populist, radical right parties, but they tend to use other types of labels as well. So that, again, shows you that these parties perhaps, may be trying to do this for strategic reasons for electoral reasons. And that actually brings me into my next question for both Metro and Maureen, which is the third question and one which I think because of course, we will be living onto the covid 19 pandemic for well over a year now. And the first question here, but I want to address is the covid 19 pandemic and whether radical right parties in Scandinavia, have they managed to keep their focus on immigrants and more broadly, the issue of immigration during the covid 19 pandemic? And secondly, how is the radical right performed electorally speaking, in you know, Scandinavia in particularly in both the cases of Norway and Sweden, during the covid 19 pandemic? And that's the question for you both better and Maureen. Mette Wiggen 19:47 Okay, thanks, James. I think it's very difficult for them because the mainstream has given into the demands on many levels just on especially in Norway and Denmark. The the you know the the remounts for stricter border control immigration control etc They they mainstream is doing it then the that they said they don't put it on the agenda many years ago but a moment the hardly any any new immigrants so to complain about the focus is on people already here in Norway for example the the progress party has been very, very active in stressing how dangerous immigrants are to spreaders not caring not wearing a mask celebrating having parties and weddings, not understanding social distancing or other restrictions that natives would easily abide by. And also they've introduced this this expression import infection. But this has also been been taken up by that by the by the mainstream. I don't know if that's the case in Sweden or Denmark, but in the program's part initially called it immigrant infection. It's like like, though the China virus is it's that bad, but it was also used by by the press. I think it happened once or twice like a headline in a major national paper. But it was picked up on unchanged so people are allowed to say immigrant infection anymore but embody infection and the current and not the mainstream. The government even is giving data related to who has been infected, infected from where and when and what areas etc. Of course we have similar things here in the UK as well. But they've been very very, at the forefront of stigmatising immigrant communities as well as for foreign residents coming into Norway from abroad. For example, after after Christmas, a labour politician in in central of Norway, actually said that, that now we have to brace ourselves because they all the Polish people are coming back from the holidays in like hundreds of flights coming in the few days or something like that. And clearly not accepting that Polish immigrants who work in Norway are residents in Norway. And they live and work they're specifically trying to create some kind of, of difference there as well. Very xenophobic. And also the progress party has been very successful in in shifting legislation, for example, or quick emergency measures. For example, they were the first ones to to demand that Norway would only accept Norwegian tests in Norway, for for people flying in. Because there was an issue with fake tests that were found. So they Oh, that was another thing that was going on for about for ages, say COVID tests from abroad. And they also called for stricter rules on immigrant labour. But at the same time this they're worried about small businesses depend on workers from abroad, but they I think that has come a little bit late and are trying to try to show that care about small businesses. A couple of weeks ago, they celebrated that that goes parliament to extend time of residency for you know, immigrants in Norway from three years to five years for to get indefinite leave to remain. So they're constantly pushing and showing what they've done. Nothing more and probably with her research knows much more about this than I do for all the countries. Thanks matter. Well, Maureen Eger 23:55 In many countries around the world, radical right politicians and parties, downplayed the pandemic and oppose public health measures that limited people's mobility or mandated mask wearing. Well, without getting too much into the hotly contested Swedish strategy suffices. Suffice it to say that Sweden's relatively liberal approach meant that SD couldn't rail against public health mandates in the way that other similar parties did in other countries. Instead, early in the pandemic, me Oh cousin was the harshest critic of the Swedish approach among the opposition party leaders, even calling the high death rates in the spring of 2020 a massacre. So, of course, for political reasons, it's important for SD to rail against whatever the government is doing, but in this case, it was in a way that was very different from how radical right parties were handling the public health mandates in other countries right before the pandemic hit st was actually pulling in first place. For the first time ever, but polls now show them back in third place yet a percentage point or two ahead of where they finished in 2018 when they garnered 17.5% of the national vote, however, something pretty major has changed in Swedish politics recently. Before centre right parties that between 2004 and 2019 made up a political alliance called the Alliance. So not the Alliance that's currently in Norway. This is a this is a this was a centre right political alliance. So in 2019, the Alliance broke up, and they've made clear that they will not campaign together in the 2022 election. their breakup had much to do with the Sweden Democrats actually specifically, the Alliance had an internal disagreements about whether or not to rely on tacit support from SD to make possible a centre right government after the 2018 election. Along with the Left Party, two of the four centre right parties, the centre Party and the liberals chose to back the social democratic and Green Party coalition to keep the Sweden Democrats from having any power. Now, three of the former Alliance parties the liberals, the moderates and Christian Democrats have said that they're open to working with SD to form a government following the 2022 election, most likely with the moderate party leader as prime minister, though if SD won the largest share of boats, I guess that would be something that would be debated. If this comes to fruition, SD would play an important role in shaping what Sweden's immigration and integration policies would become. The pandemic has been a moment where immigration has slowed almost to a halt. So SD, like the Norwegian progress party has used this time to focus on policy proposals that would make life very different for immigrants already in Sweden, and also apparently to make Sweden less attractive to potential future immigrants. For example, SD wants to make social welfare benefits contingent on citizenship, rather than residency or even permanent residency. And the party wants to introduce language requirements for permanent residency, which would be a huge change and limit residence permits on the basis of family reunification. Also, as the advocates for a change in refugee policies, that focus in argues with me that Sweden could effectively stopped taking in any refugees at all, and still be in compliance with international law. James Downes 27:35 Thank you both. For our listeners, listening in back home. What we can see here is that immigration has, totally slowed clearly in both countries as a result of the covid 19 pandemic. But, of course, we do see the radical right parties that seems in both countries still using these xenophobic messages, but you targeting different types groups domestically, in both countries, as well. So we can kind of see, perhaps we can call it an evolution of strategies, you know, kind of anti immigrant sentiment strategies in both countries that and we've actually seen, of course, varying electoral fortunes for different types of radical right parties. In the covid 19 pandemic. Of course, there have been a number of books published over the last year, but there's been a centre for analysis of the radical right, a co authored book edited by Tamir Bar-On and Barbara Molas. From the Centre for Analysis of the Radical rRght, that features a number of key contributors, such as Professor Hans-Georg Betz from Zurich, our colleague from CARR, who's also shown that there's been varying electoral fortunes for different radical right parties across Europe has also been shown by by Casper Buddha. And Jacob Wondreys and Cas Mudde, both at the University of Georgia who have also shown how radical right parties at different stages of the pandemic have kind of fluctuated in the polls overall. So this leads into my next question, which is a bit of a crystal ball gazing question for you both matter and Maureen, but I was wondering about how do you both foresee or even predict radical right parties in Scandinavia, whether that's kind of Sweden, Norway, or even in other countries to perform, electrically speaking in in terms of a post COVID-19 World Of course, it's incredibly difficult for us to make, you know, accurate predictions about elections, particularly with the wide levels of fragmentation polarisation that we see it not just in Western Europe, but across the whole of Europe right now with anti incumbency, effects. And again, polarisation and fragmentation. So I'm wondering if either of you could make any predictions about you know, the future of electoral fortunes for radical right parties in a post COVID-19 world/political landscape? Mette Wiggen 30:00 Thank you. I think it's depends very much on what the other parties are doing. It depends on the economy. It depends on, you know, when and if immigration is going to take off again, but for for the Norwegian case, I doubt that they're gonna have time to do to get much more support than the habits and moment because the the progress party had in the previous elections in 2017, they had more than 16% their elections in September, the party was polling at 8.4% on a couple of months ago. Now with a new leader, they're up at 12%. Not entirely sure about the reason for that yet. But I, you know, I think they're gonna be hard push to do particularly well, in the next selections, especially because the mainstream keeps sealing their issues. Their Parliament disagrees, agreed on massive crisis package from the sovereign wealth fund, for example, Norway has all oil. And the progress party has always demanded that Norway should use more of the oil money for welfare. And for roads, for example, but they're not getting the credit for it not even now, even though it's been on their agenda for decades, I think. I worry a bit more than I would like to about this, this alliance party. Because they are going to stand in for election in 11, in all 11 counties, because their political party, they get state funding, as soon as parties do that. And this is in a climate of an increase in in hatred and attacks online, especially. And it's you know, remember, it's, it's now nearly 10 years ago, since the political attack and massacre at Udaya and the mainstream really hasn't done enough to confront hate speech, racism, and especially on the internet, and the media, in newspaper columns, for example, comments after articles is really vile. And there was another attempted terror attack and racist murder by right wing extremist in 2019. If you remember, I didn't shake the political system as much as I had expected, it's kind of fizzled out, there was very little interest, I think, also from you know, looking at it from abroad. So radical right activities online and in newspaper comments continue to be led demise by lack of action from the mainstream, if they attack the attacks on targeting the Left, left wing politicians and common commentators, but also immigrants are very openly especially minority politicians as well. And that's got worse with COVID. Their rhetoric that the writer has been using is particularly worrying. I think that survivors from Mutya and family members of victims have been exposed to hate mail, and social media attacks and death, even death threats. And you know, this has not been dealt with properly. butea survivors have even been accused publicly by both politicians and the journalist for playing the OTL card. But they are now that then the Labour Party youth movement, RF, they have published a book with articles from survivors and family members. And they demand they've got some quiet lots of media attention around that not enough I think, but they're demanding that this should be stopped to the hatred online and and in the media. Maureen Eger 35:02 Thanks Mette. Yes, I it's a was a strange exercise to formalise predictions about the future. I've never done that as a sociologist before. I'm used to analysing data from the past the recent past, but you know, things that have already happened. And in the very first months of the pandemic, my colleague, Dr. Michel O'Brien, and I started thinking about how the pandemic could alter migration patterns. And what this would then mean for anti immigrant sentiments and for radical right mobilisation and immigration policies going forward. So we focused on these border closures, the border closures that were implemented initially to stop the spread of covid 19. So I think we can think about this as a, like an exhaustion, a shock to a system that's operating in a normal way. And then this is worldwide exhaustion of shocks that led to the for the most part, you know, countries all over the world to completely shut their borders. So we decided to focus on what this would mean first, for Migration trends. So based on recent data from previous years, we were we estimated that 7.5 million for nationals would have travelled to OECD countries, which are the largest advanced capitalist economies in the world. So 7.5 million foreign nationals would have travelled to OECD countries for work or extended stays in 2020. We, we hypothesise that the larger these restrictions are in place, the larger the potential backup of what would otherwise be typical levels of migration. Demographic research suggests that when otherwise normal processes of normal demographic patterns are halted, such as birth rates during times of war. There's a rebound in those processes once it's possible. Thus, we hypothesise that a build up of unmet demand for opportunities to emigrate from sending countries and also demands from destination countries for foreign labour would lead to a migration rebound or a migration spike in the months and the years following countries living, lifting their COVID-19 restrictions. We also posited that these spikes in migration will then set in motion, sociological and political processes and outcomes, including increased anti immigration mobilisation on the part of radical right parties. Although there is not a straightforward relationship between objective immigration and objective immigration generated diversity and radical right mobilisation, there is evidence from previous research that rapid increases in the flows of migrants heightens anti immigrant sentiments heightens the salience of the migration issue politically, and can lead to increased support for parties with anti immigrant platforms. I'm thinking in particular of research a recent studies done by Kaufman on 2017 on UKIP, and also Sorenson in 2016 on the Norwegian Progress Party. Those based on existing research, we further hypothesise that these combined processes may culminate in support for reintroducing restrictive immigration policies. So we think this would trigger a bit of a feedback loop and reinforce a cycle of migration, suppression, migration, spikes, migration, suppression, migration spikes, of course, these are just hypotheses or models just, you know, theoretical at the moment. But we, we, we sort of formalise this because we need them to be testable hypotheses. So we published a piece about this and international migration review, which came out at the end of last year, in which we outline a research agenda for how these ideas could be tested over time, postpaid post pandemic, we see this as a really important area for future research. And so in many ways, you know, personally, I hope we're wrong. But we'll see it as as much as as you know, it really just depends on a lot of factors. But this should be this should be a really important area for future research. James Downes 39:23 Thank you very much both for going into very comprehensive detais alongside your predictions and really interesting as well, Maureen, to hear about your recent article published in the International Migration Review. And you know about these, these shocks and kind of spikes that we see and also coming at this from from a more sociological perspective. So I think our listeners should really check out that that latest article that you have an international migration review to find out a lot more than and you mentioned that it's just kind of the hypotheses and you know, that you have at the moment but I think it's good to have some really, you know, this work can have Some really important implications as well when we we look at the radical race in a couple of years time. So thank you very much for Mette and Maureen, for a really insightful episode overall. And it's been great to have you both on the show. The final question that I have, it's not really a question, but more on the perspective of our listeners listening in back home on Spotify, or Apple podcasts, or whether, you know, other platform as a platform that our listeners kind of listening to this episode from. So where can our listeners find out more about the latest research and publications related to the radical right? died? If you have a Twitter account, or a personal website that you'd like to let our listeners know about? Mette Wiggen 40:39 No, I'm not very active on Twitter, I tweet or follow some others. And most of my research these days goes into teaching and research for outlets such as openDemocracy. Fair observer. I have a book in my head. But I don't really know what that is yet, but it's on these issues. So I'm going to work on that this summer. Maureen Eger 41:05 Well, I still am on Twitter. But I'm not the most active member of the platform. So I'm not going to discourage anyone from following me. But if people are interested in my research, I do post on Twitter when recent things come out. And I also try to link to important work that colleagues are doing, that I think people should read about and know about. If people are interested in seeing more of my research in particular, that I've done over time, probably finding me on Google Scholar is the best way to go. So just google scholar my name or find more on my university website, Department of Sociology at Umea University in Northern Sweden. James Downes 42:02 Thanks a lot, both. Many thanks to both Maureen and Mette for coming today to share their latest expertise about both country cases. And for listeners back home. I hope you enjoyed today's episode. And please join us next time and have a great day and week ahead, everybody as well. Thank you very much! Transcribed by https://otter.ai