Speaker 0 (0s): So what is Russia's game in the bowl and why should the region respond in that way? That's what I want to focus in. Speaker 1 (9s): You're listening to the Balkan circle, brought to you by the center for studies at the university of Texas at Austin. For those of you who don't know me, my name is Mary Neuberger, and I'm a professor in the department of history here at the university of Texas. I'm also the director for the center for Russian East European and your region studies and the chair of Slavic and your Asian studies. And I am really pleased to welcome you to our first fall 2020 Balkan circle. We also had a Balkan circle last year. It was our first year, and that was in person. This is our first virtual Vulcan circle, given the circumstances. And although we're sad to not be meeting with all of you in person, I think this gives us certain opportunity to bring in other people from other institutions in the us and abroad. And I'm going to hand this off to my cohost and that's Carol Abramoff. Who's really the brains behind this whole operation. Thank you very much. It's the particular Speaker 0 (1m 15s): Sure on this gloomy Austin rainy day to continue within the initiative and with a fantastic speaker and a fantastic guests for all things bulking today, we have a very prominent guest of ours that we began the series with dr. Dimitrov betcha, who is the director of the European policy Institute. The think tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria in his book titled rival power Russia in Southeastern Europe, which was published by Yale university press in 2017. It's Russia's geopolitical role in the Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. It is my particular pleasure to virtually host you dr. Bev and the floor is yours So much. I'm really thankful for this generous introduction and body opportunity to speak to, you know, on the 15th of March, president Alexander Woodridge of Serbia had this press conference in bell rates cost base in the white house signing the deal with Kosovo. But on the 15th of March, he was in the survey and Capitol and he had this memorable press conference where first of all would be the production of a log down, but also he had some harsh words to say about Europe saying that European intubation is a fairy tale. It's just sweet talking from officials in Brussels and the big capitals and no action. Whereas China was helping Serbia and doing its best to support it in this difficult moment in today with a badly needed health care equipment and personal protection equipment as well. And it was not just China, which obviously grabbed the headlines with hugging the Chinese eight, delivering the two to buy rate and kissing the Chinese flag, but also Russia. Indeed. He had phone conversation with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin and couple of weeks later, 87 healthcare stuff from Russia, and also people affiliated with the ministry of emergency situations. The structure of the Russian Federation government were flying into the airport and delivering medical supplies and also expert staff to help Serbia contain COVID-19. And for those of us who study Serbia and the Serbian Russian connection, that it's not a accidental place, but it's been the site of the regular exercises. The Serbian military has helped with the Russians since 2014 and also the site where the Russians delivered in earlier years, humanitarian assistance. It was the same infrastructure of a Russian support. The Russian official muse agency does announce that much of the aid will be distributed through various originals centers, including the humanitarian assistance center, the same ministry of emergency situation established in the city of mission in Southeast Serbia, that's been discussed by Western security experts and officials for years on end, seeing it as the kind of focal point of Russian intelligence operations in the region, where does the case or not remains debatable, but Russia wanted to plant its flag as well after China was appearing to be stealing. The show is Serbia. Now the second episode happened not in Serbia, but in Bosnia where the Bostonian growth leadership essentially invited in the month of may the Russian specialists, the Russian teams from Serbia to help disinfect medical facility in the divided city of Mostar, which caused havoc in his salary level with all kinds of questions, loading, what are they up to? What is the connection between the crop at, in, in Boston? Why are the Russians appearing all of a sudden, ultimately there was a decision not to let them in taken by the Bosnia minister of security, but also that illustrated how controversial Russian presence is in the region. But this first and the second episodes were mostly to be expected. Speaker 2 (5m 41s): Speaker 0 (5m 44s): What was not expected was the streets turn around, around COVID in a Russian stomion relations in July, in the middle of July web cases molding the Serbian government decided to reintroduce some restrictive measures, which of course triggered protest to downtown were raised. And we saw some scenes of unrest. Heavy-handed police actions, of course, all kinds of havoc in the streets. Of course, the government tried to push back with the help of its loyal media, the tabloids and the TV channels is Serbia. But what came as a surprise to many was that the line, those pro voltage tabloids too, was heavily anti Russian. So all of a sudden Serbia supposed to be Russell's closes my life in the region, kind of started pushing the line at doors. People protesting in the streets of Belle rates are puppeteered by something called the Russian deep States. It was not put in for sure doing it. It was Russian security officials. Again, the deep state working behind his back, trying to destabilize the Serbian government for maintaining and risk and pushing Serbia. It was the best. Again, this was not something that would have said directly. He didn't pick up this fight certainly, but the provost it's mouthpieces, which shaped the public discourse is Serbia took a very hard Dante Russel direction, which is interesting though, an expectant, why should the friendliest country in the Balkans called it routes? Why should it be using Russia as a, as a boogeyman to score points domestically, but also to maybe overtures to the West. And again, this goes back to illustrate the difficult connection and them being a relationship between governments in the region with the Russians. At some point, the Russians Russian foreign policy is an ally Serbia cost. It will be a good example, but the other point in time, Russia is being instrumentalized as MES just care, domestic public PDM, and also to get geopolitical mileage in the West. And there is nobody more experienced in this game that the Serbian leadership, obviously, even if widget was not involved in this case, if you go back to the annexation of Crimea, the heyday of concern about the Russian revisionism in Europe, the view that dominated headlines in the West was that Russia was staging a geopolitical comeback, that it was not just intent of recuperating its influence in the former Soviet space, but also it was pushing in other regionals much more closer to what we could describe as this core Europe in a hearing in early 2015 before the Senate foreign relations committee, the then secretary of state, John Kerry put Serbia, Montenegro Kosovo in the same basket with modeler Transnistria Georgia and the, like he said, all those countries are in the firing line. So Russia was trying to reestablish it for Germany, not just near abroad, but also in the Western box. And that was the feeling that Russia is back. The second theme that permeated Western discourse, both on both sides of the Atlantic was that geopolitics was back in the sense that the bulkers having been the Apple of this hole in the continents politics in the late 19th, early 20th century was a game contested theory. It was of course, the Centennial of the first world war in 2014 with a lot of books coming out old. So a lot of common food pieces look in 2013, nobody conceivable a war in Europe, but now it's not inconceivable. And the history is repeating itself. But this time it's not just Russia, as well as there's Turkey and China was not on the radar. But certainly the idea is that there's this arena of great pop politics and the Balkans are very much into the focal point. This is, this is the one view of the region that very much defines thinking for a long time. If you look at the U S the bulkers was not an item of interest, but once it got into this geopolitical political frame, there was especially in the think tanks. So cute. And the commentariat, there was a bit of renewed interest. I remember a prominent columnists saying that from first foreign war after inauguration in 2017, we'll be in the bulkers again, these theories is coming back. So that was this one view that was making the rounds back then with Russell very much at the center. And it's very much glass with an earlier view. That was very much prevalent in Europe, in the two thousands, especially in Germany as a core country, that Russia is there. It has its own interests. And it's trying to, of course, recuperate some of its lost inflows in Eastern Europe, but ultimately the ways to cooperate with it in this paradigm, the Balkans could be seen as a site where the West, which is dominant player and there, and the Russians could do business together. They could build pipelines, they could establish various modes of commercial cooperation. And that was a view share, certainly in those big European countries, Italy and Germany would be good examples, but also others, but not unlike the perspective, the Obama administration on Russia during the so-called resets and not necessarily related to the Balkans, but also on other global issues from the writing of the sanctions in 2010, two nuclear cooperation. So that Russia could be a responsible stakeholder in regional, but also blow up politics, but have lost two extreme views. My view is somewhere in the middle in the sense that I don't obviously having written a book called rival power. I don't buy into the idea that Russia is a benign actor and it's not revisionist. In fact, my host ticket's about how Russia is strive to challenge a Western institution, some West Western States and this vulnerable corner of Europe. But on the other hand, what I see in the Balkans is quite a bit of the tail wagging the dog, as opposed to countries like Serbia and its neighbors in the Western Balkans, also Bulgaria, Greece, and so on and so forth. So rather see them as objects of geopolitical influence. I see a lot of agency in those places. So those governments, political and business leads have been able on many occasions to manipulate Russian foreign policy, to bring Russia in for their own internal purposes. And the same goes about other international actors, including the you and the WestBridge March. So what well we'll buy approach of difference from the world is all there in bulks, especially in think tanks I'll put and comment. There is this emphasis on local responses, local perspectives, and a lot called political dynamics and how those external actors feature into the local scene. But it's more of a bottom up perspective on long international and regional politics. What I want to do now is look very briefly at the evolution of, of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans, the 99, as soon as the collapse of the Soviet union, and also then move to the various issues at stake. First of all, security Russia at the end of the day is a, is a big security player. The second of all, to discuss a Russian economic presence and how it bears on politics in the region. And lastly, to consider Russian influence on societies, other stake issue with the notion of softball, whether it's appropriate to what Russia is up to in the region, Back to the 99 syllabus that as the time of the philosophy was Slavia as the single most important geopolitical events in the region. Also arguably in European politics, you didn't see levels of violence unprecedented since the end of second world war on European soil, Russia was involved early on. That was the first test for both Soviet Russia's foreign policy from 1982 onwards virtually towards the Soviet union. But close it's really essential is that Russia had a very difficult balancing act to maintain on the one hand. That was the time when it wanted to forge an Alliance of sorts with the West with big European powers and the U S to cooperate. And the Balkans was a test case there. And on the other hand, it wanted to assert its independence and autonomy at a time when it was dire straights, domestically with the economic transition and, and various waves of political upheavals. Remember 1993 tanks stormed the then Russian legislature and there was constitutional change and so on and so forth. So now there was a lot of going on inside Russia itself at the time, but thruster was there on the ground, the uniform Yugoslavia, and the way to assert your role in forming your style was by cooperating with Slobodan Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, but that was not caking coupling. There were many instances where the relationship was pretty much dysfunctional with the SERPs, using Russia as a cover and trying to drag Russia into conflicts with the West that Russian diplomas didn't want to get into necessarily. They wanted to avoid a situation, but even though there were risks, the clearest being the war in Kosovo and Russia to convey Spence had to back down and the Western pressure put troops on the ground in pristine airports, risking a standoff confrontation with NATO, but ultimately finding a way to be escalate. There were also gains made into these periods. And one game was the establishment of the so-called contact group. Corrigo Slavia in 1994 after Russia media, part of the crisis around Sarajevo. So Russia diplomacy was not necessarily unsuccessful. It actually caught some points, dangerous symbolic recognition, and was able to establish military presence in Boston and ultimately Constable to cooperation with the West. If we go back in time from today's perspective, it's inconceivable that Russian troops shouldn't be serving in a natal mission, but up was the case in Bosnia. And that was the case slavery console, the resolution 1244 establishing the status of course, war will make cooperation with the Russians. So this tense relationship put to the test many times actually actually survived. And it was a mixed bag for the Russians, the narrative that it was all about. Humiliation doesn't really hold against the actual records. Even if Russia, when it tried to play hard ball ultimately found itself on the back foot in the 1990s. So that was the first episode. This Yeltsin era involvement in the Balkans as a stepping stone for claiming a place in the new European security infrastructure. It was never about the booklets itself. It was about Russia's place in European political and security affairs. Second face comes when he gets into office. I think he did see the Balkans is a liability from the Austin era. There was nothing to be gained because he wanted to cooperate with the West. There was the new reset, but it was all about post nine 11 corporation and of ganas, Stan and Russia, U S relations in this golden age, when put up here to be moderately protested, the bulkers was a sideshow and putting was the person who in 2003, actually decided to cough a Russian peacekeepers peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. He brought back troops. So after 2003 Russia, as multi-head forces on the ground, unlike the former Soviet space, there are no troops formerly deployed in the region. The only time the Russian military appears in Southeast Europe is when it trades together with Serbia. And that was a turning point that went to notice because the agenda had moved on and the bulkers were not very as visible in 2003 years there, way back you back to the tree. And the Russel was not to return until the middle of the two thousands. So fast-forward when people started discussing the return of Russia to Balkan geopolitics around the time of premier. That was a mischaracterization because Russia never really left and it didn't leave because in the mid two thousands, it really engaged in the region to a new channel, which was a Russia's energy presence of Russia's energy products. Bill's convinced that cause gas in the region, they remained tied to Gus prom as the prime supplier, but in 2006 Russia put forwards South stream pipeline. That was the initial move around the time that Ukraine had its first orange revolution and bypassing the Ukrainian grid became a priority for Russia and Southeast Europe. All of a sudden came on the map as a alternative, these transit rolls Speaker 4 (20m 0s): . Speaker 0 (20m 3s): And you said you saw a lot of faction, a lot of diplomacy around those energy projects with Bulgaria, but also with Serbia and with others, with Russia, trying to reengage and maybe much knocking on open doors, because there are a lot of people in government and government dependent businesses willing to engage with the Russians and to get some benefits along the way. So that was the first interesting moment. The second interesting moment of course is 2008 when Constable became independent, the unilateral declaration of independence. And it was at that juncture when Serbia actually really reached back to the Russians and it was not Alexandra Gucci and the netlist supers, the so-called pro-Western forces, who at the time were empowering, bro. Reagan was president, but he started in his people. They re reestablished the Alliance with Russia, which had some bad baggage coming along because of the Milosevic connection, but they saw Russia as an ally and his battle to push against coastal independence. So there were at least those two openings for Russia to reengage. It's essential to think about in this second face and putting one and putting two is that Russell is not necessarily positioning itself as aren't they Western force. Of course it was staking battle against the U S and its allies over Kosovo was the legal battle for a small plate out and international court of justice. But there were five known recognizing member States of the EU as well. So you couldn't say that it's a necessarily a West versus Russia conflict played out in the Balkans at the time. And secondly, South stream was not the gospel project politics involved in the Italian company. Any government has FTE influence over all the corporate governance, as well as the French and German entities involved. So it was a joint project involving the Russians and European energy firms, along with the national companies of the countries. Along the way, what really changed the game, I think is the third term, the Putin return to the Kremlin in 2012. And if you've noticed Russia's positioning in the Balkans is always a function of the general atmosphere in relations between Western Russia. So it's not a bold how Russia reacts to local events that much, but the color relations structure between the Western Russia and put his friend turn to power in 2012, who was very much into the heading of reclaiming Russia's power and trying to prevent the Western powers from meddling inside Russia. That was a time of demonstrations in Moscow, st. Petersburg, Russia took a more confidential stance, which became clear after, after Crimea and Ukraine crisis. And he saw a number of pro-Russian governments or Russia friendly governments declining to join the sanctions that's Serbia, but also then Macedonia at the time, as well as Turkey. But you saw a ramping of Russian disinformation influence campaign, and he saw a lot of Russian support for forces arguing against the West and pushing against natal membership in a number of countries, as well as trying to pack the U as well. So Russia became much more confrontational around 2014, 2015, and as the tourist States, but it's, I think it's partly to deeply different from both the Yeltsin era and also the early era when it was not a competition, it was not a rivalry. And we are very much in this third States where Russia is willing to undermine the West is taking sometimes risks and it's positioning itself as, as a competitor, rather than a partner before we move into the various issue areas. What I want to highlight, however, is that Russia's policy of confrontation has been very opportunistic. What happens is that you exploit weaknesses resentment against the West with your societies, or willingness by local leads to profits and to generate rents form economic projects or neighbor to neighbor rivalries and, and, and conflicts as the cost of issue. So you want to profit from those to make life difficult for NATO and the all the Russia Balkan Balkans policy. Isn't, it's clearly not an attempt to build some sort of alternative tier of institutions, bring those conversations to the Russian sphere of influence because being the hedge Ramon, it's also associated with costs and Russia doesn't have the resources to keep the region together and to pay for the region. That was scary. The case in the cold war, when you had client States and Russia did carry the security, but also they conomic costs of keeping them in its own camp, the most Russia, but the Soviet union at the time. But you don't see this dynamic. Now, what you see is just obstructionism putting a spanner in the works for the West, trying to exploit weaknesses and maybe trying to materialize or to profit from the kind of useless you'd have as a bargaining chip is a widow. If instead in Moscow, this policy's fully rewarded takers. They clearly consider that the West is meddling in their backyard, in the post Soviet space, spirit and Georgia and modeler in Ukraine for certain. And now look at Shankar pushing this narrative that it's protest SIBO, Russ are driven by hostile Western powers. So if you see it as paranoia, it's a mindset that the West is up to. No good. And is trying to undermine you from within it's fair game to, for you to do the same in areas falling within the Western sphere of influence. So that's pretty much the Russian policy these days, let me know we'll security, the economy and society In the securities fear thing. Serbia is, is the one which matters because of console and also because of military and defense cooperation, including the sale of, of Russian weaponry, but Russia gain is not the major factor in, in those convince because it's not very geographically distant, where it really matters in the Balkans is those countries that are closer to his boundaries. In other words, Bulgaria, Romania, because they own the black sea. And when we discussed bogus. So usually the forming Slavia, but the bulkers is a broader array of countries. And those who are closer to the Russian boundaries and are exposed to rushing that way, very much more vulnerable to Russian heart power. Because if you look at the balance of power in the black sea, after that accusation of premia, the conclusion is very clear that NATO is in defensive position. So the big headline is Russia is a security plan, the Western Balkans, but less sold than it is in India because of the black sea and the proximity proximity factor. And it's evolved in Kosovo because if it's UN security council seat, but not to the extent that it has a full vital or on Serbian policy. Now we've seen, how would you just foreign shopping is turned to the white house to, to the U S as an alternative source of authority for mediator, but even be followed argue after the failure of this ICJ case 2010, what Serbia did was just move the resolution of cost. So when the normalization talks to the isolating Russia, so Russia is occasionally brought in, but it doesn't have a seat at the table all the time. And it's up to the Serbians when Russia is brought into the picture or not, the Russia is much more prevalent in Bosnia because of its institutional role in the peace implementation council. That's the very short version of Russia security. It has some access, but where Russian power really, really makes a difference is most frontline States, ultimately Romania and Bulgaria, much less in the Western Balkans in the economy. Russia is really important oil and gas, but it's not a major trading and investment sources. The, if you look at the region to create goals back to the core Europe, so Russia is simply not in the same league, but it has foothold in some critical sectors that F political implications. It doesn't mean that all the Russian companies that do business in the bulk and say a small investor buying real estate in Martinique, roll all the way to look coil, owning the biggest refinery in Bulgaria, but also in the post-communist boggles gas. It's not a day extension of Russian foreign policy. They have their business objectives to pursue. They want to make money, not maximize the chromium power, but as many specialists looking at Russia argued if the push comes to shove and the CEO of Lucara gets a phone call from the feminine that he needs to perform some services for the motherland, thinking that it's a clear decision, these are resources that can be mobilized in the Western Balkans. The people sometimes exaggerates Russian energy influence because they assume that it's like everywhere else in Eastern Europe. But if you look at places like Kosovo, Montenegro, even Bosnia, certainly Albania, they don't consume much gas or not, no gas at all. In the case, of course, Russia is not that embedded there is, is this in Bulgaria or, or Serbia. So there is a huge regional variation from place to place when it comes to Russian economic influence, lastly society. And this is one area that Russia has an advantage. Why? Because to predict this kind of influence with information operations and pushing your narrative is very much low cost. It's not as if sending your paratroopers to Pristina or building a pipeline. It's a complicated venture and the cost of a one, one as well, whereas establishing a subsidiary of the split MC agency and in Serbia, having content in cerebral creation, Bostonian that is then freely available to all kinds of other news outlets in the newscast of spooning. Serbia is sheruts for free, with a number of there's a free journal station. So if you drive around Serbia, you'll be sure to be listening to Sputnik news on the radio all the time. It doesn't cost a lot of money. You are preaching to the converted. You should tell people and against Serbia, but also half of more than events they may do is evil. And that serves to have been victimized by the Americans. You don't have to do a lot of convincing. There is this purchase without now COVID has provided some good opportunities for the zoo information or those conspiracy theories that link the Gates to five G and sinister plants. They typically originate from the West, but they're amplified by all kinds of Russian media operations. And they are very effective because they also work in societies say Romania, which is, has a fine tradition of Russell Fabia that are not necessarily pro Kremlin, but you might have the same nationalistic nativist impulse, and see conspiracies from least, but also from the West. So Russia doesn't need to convince people in Russia is novel. I'll put in disease a hero. So there's some market for that. But all you have to do is just to play on this feeling of inferiority, of being flattened by the West and your values and your principles being put to the risk LGBT issues, feature prominently, as you can imagine. And there's a huge market in this place. And again, what it highlights is that the main factors and enabling conditions are as Russia, wouldn't be as successful. And by Russia here, I don't just be the Kremlin, but also the constellation of various actors involved in this new influence peddling. It won't be successful if there was medial literacy in the region, if there was transparency, media ownership, and if corruption was not such an issue, the bulk of Southeast Europe as a whole is a low hanging fruit. And it doesn't take much to be influential if a situation on the ground is the way it is. So any, again, any policy to counter Russian influence maligning influence should start first from enabling conditions. What makes Russia influential and then consider what Russia is more your son and these are, and what to do about pushing back on the Kremlin. So let me stop here and take some questions. Speaker 1 (33m 32s): You've been listening to the Balkan Circle on the Slavic connection, brought to you by the center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies at the University of Texas at Austin. For more information please visit www.slavxradio.com/balkancircle.