Case History 10
===

Liz: [00:00:00] Welcome to the GBA Case History Series, brought to you by the GBA Podcast. My name is Elizabeth Brown, and I'm a principal geotechnical engineer at JLT Consultants.

Abi: And I'm Abi Corbett, a project consultant at SME. Today we're diving into GBA case history number 10, which is a project management focus case that checks a lot of boxes that we keep seeing come up again and again. We're looking at communication breakdowns, value engineering pressures, ignored technical warnings, and ultimately litigation.

Liz: Yeah, so this is like one of those case histories where honestly, almost everything that could go wrong did go wrong. And really what makes it especially painful is that many of the issues were identified like really early on, like even before construction started.

Abi: Exactly. I was really surprised when I was reading this one because it [00:01:00] highlights what happens when sound geoprofessional recommendations are just sidelined or a role gets blurred, or even communication pathways get constrained just by, in quote, "the name of efficiency," but let's be real, it's never that efficient.

And honestly, if you found yourself thinking like I have that I've raised a concern and no one listened, this episode's gonna be for you.

Liz: Yeah, I think there's plenty of us that are in this boat. This is gonna be, this is gonna be a great one. So why don't we start kind of like big picture context here. The situation is, is that the client here was a county government in Central California, and they were operating in a region that really is heavily dependent upon imported water from the northern portions of the state.

Abi: Right. And the state actually constructed a new aqueduct to move the water from Northern California to the central and southern regions. Now, the [00:02:00] particular county we're talking about, they wanted to connect the new aqueduct to their existing canal network.

Liz: Right. Makes sense. But initially they looked at two different options of, hey, how, how are we gonna make this happen? And their-- the first option, I mean, it was pretty straightforward, not a lot to it. I mean, really all they were gonna do was, construct a roughly four-mile cross-connect.

Abi: Honestly, I love a simple answer, but sometimes it is fun to get a little bit sassier. So they actually have a second option too, and it was definitely more ambitious. So they'd expand that cross canal into an elongated lake system, and the approach would basically increase water storage, create recreational amenities, plus support the local wildlife

Liz: I mean, that sounds good, right? If we're gonna, if we're gonna do the job, like, let's do something cool, right?

So, [00:03:00] right, and importantly, this multipurpose approach, it made this project eligible for state and federal funding. So I mean, that's kinda like the big driver of, "Hey, let's do more."

Abi: Oh, absolutely. I can't blame them for that one. But now we've got the state involved, and they ran a preliminary feasibility study, and it was done by the California Department of Water Resources. The early findings they got basically suggested a pretty low benefit-cost ratio. We were looking at like 1.4 to one, and that's with the assumption that we're looking at 2,000 acres of recreational area and 550 of those acres are water.

Liz: Okay. So, you know, some good, good numbers there. So the county reviews the report and they decide, okay, we're gonna retain an AE firm to advance the design, have them submit a [00:04:00] detailed feasibility analysis, right? Kinda go through some of this in a little bit more detail. And interestingly enough, as this is happening, the numbers kind of started changing here.

Abi: Yeah, and I feel like our story kinda starts rolling here with that. So that firm's proposal reduced the overall scope to about 1,500 acres, and the two connecting lakes are gonna total like 980 acres. And additionally, they have like 300 acres of islands, dams, and buffer zone type things. Very much still feasible, but now the already low benefit-cost ratio, it dropped even more, and it dropped to 1.06 to 1

Liz: Yeah, that's like nothing. Not much going on there, right?

Abi: Yeah, that's about as close to one-to-one as you can really get.

Liz: Pretty much, [00:05:00] right? Maybe a rounding error there, right?

Which really, with a number that low, I mean, I think that should be triggering an alarm, right? Like someone indeed should be going, "Hmm, like maybe let's re-look into this."

Abi: Uh, like maybe not a red flag, could be an orange flag, but it's definitely a razor-thin margin there. And with that little margin for error, it's gonna come down to budget and schedule and performance, and it's gonna get detailed. And so we have this little, little bit of margin for error, and the county's still gonna go ahead and go with the more detailed proposal.

Liz: Yeah, it's kind of crazy how that happens, right?

Abi: Yeah. I mean, I totally understand wanting to do a really cool project, but I really want the benefits to really benefit.

Liz: Exactly. So really at that point, the county brought in a GBA member firm [00:06:00] to support the final design and construction, specifically for the geotechnical engineering services.

Abi: Right. And the GBA member firm had a senior geotechnical engineer review some of the prior studies, and then they even walked the site. Based on that experience, he suspected the site was underlain by old lake bed deposits and possibly some silty and clay soils with some sand lenses.

Liz: And he also suspected the presence of gypsum. And that, that's gonna be key here because something that's important to know is that gypsum dissolves in fresh water, and that can promote seepage and instability and really, you know, some long-term performance issues, when we're dealing with water.

Abi: Okay, so knowing all of this, the member firm proposed a really comprehensive scope. They wanted to do some geotechnical studies, wave and shoreline protection [00:07:00] studies, some soil science studies, a full environmental review. They're looking at the works here.

Liz: Oh, sounds like it. After extensive negotiations, the county declined that broader scope of work that was proposed, and they made a critical decision at this point. So super critical, and it-- what they decided is that all design elements would remain with the AE firm and that the member firm's role would be limited strictly to geotechnical advice. So they're cutting them down to, like, nothing.

Abi: Especially if they're proposing such a big scope to cut them to that seems a little interesting. But even more significant of a worry here, the county insisted on separate contracts and full-blown discouraged direct communication between the GBA member firm and that AE firm.

Liz: Like a red flag, right? Like a red flag should be flying [00:08:00] there, right? Um, so many of these case histories that we talk about so many times the issues come down to communication, right? So, huge red flag there. So in this case, any recommendations that the geotechnical engineer had had to flow to the county first and then be passed to the AE firm, but only if the county approved them. I kinda have the, in my mind, like the telephone game, right? Where like everyone sits in a circle and one person starts with a message and it, it goes all the way around and back to the first person, and it's not what it started as. Like, that's kinda what is in my head.

Abi: Yes. And honestly, I keep wondering if the county just really wanted to be involved in the decisions, but even then I just-- I would wanna go direct to the AE firm. Like the county is not the expert in this decision, but we just do what the clients say, I suppose

Liz: That's what happens. [00:09:00] So once construction began, the member firm's project manager noticed two additional immediate red flags.

Abi: Right. So that first one, the low benefit-cost ratio started driving corner cutting. And the second, the communication structure basically stifled the critical technical information flow.

Liz: Right, 'cause, you know, the communication isn't there. Getting the information from one person to the next and those who need to work together to make those decisions just, it wasn't happening. Which then causes the problems, right? So problems started to materialize almost immediately, and really one of the biggest problems that they were having was some shoreline erosion

Abi: It just, it's unfortunate because remember, the member firm recommended a detailed wind and wave study and that would help [00:10:00] them design proper shoreline protection. But of course, those recommendations were rejected.

Liz: Right, and instead the AE firm took responsibility and they selected a soil cement lining based primarily on first cost economy.

Abi: There's that corner cutting a little bit there.

Liz: Just a little. 

Abi: The member firm's got to step in and do a little bit of that advisory role, and they recommended placing soil cement in horizontal compacted lifts and then trimming them back to the slope, essentially just building up the thickness and the durability straight up in the system.

Liz: And something about that recommendation is that they also recommended a rich mix, meaning more cement percentage than maybe you normally would have used. So they recommended about 10% cement, and really that was due to the soil's high silt content.

Abi: Makes sense to me. [00:11:00] But as the story seems to be going, those recommendations got rejected too. And the AE-- Yeah, I mean, it wouldn't be a case history without

Liz: Exactly.

Abi: It. So the AE firm decided a six-inch lining placed directly on the slope is just gonna be adequate.

Liz: Oh, I see problems coming.

Abi: Yep.

Liz: This is where it really starts to stack up. I mean, the AE firm didn't share the final design plans or the construction specs with the member firm.

Abi: Not only that, the contractor was instructed to just develop the final lighting design while in the field.

Liz: Ooh, and guess what? That approach failed, and the contractor couldn't construct the lining as proposed, and the AE firm switched to a pumpcrete concrete lining midstream.

Abi: So we're already having a bunch of stuff [00:12:00] go sideways and midstream changes. So even then, after all these changes happened, the top of the embankment remained unlined, still super vulnerable to elements.

Liz: And well, the consequences showed up quickly. Imagine that. After the initial filling, a windstorm produced three-foot waves, causing severe erosion and overtopping of the perimeter dikes.

Abi: Talk about seeing the effects of your decision quickly.

Liz: Right.

Abi: And not only that, at the same time, we're gonna start seeing those soil issues surfacing. They planted trees along the shoreline and they died because of the unfavorable soil chemistry and the water levels, which is exactly the issues the member firm had proposed studying early on in the project.

Liz: No, this is turning into an "I [00:13:00] told you so" situation

Abi: Yes!

Liz: Okay, but we're not, we're not over yet. Then came pavement failures. The AE firm assumed an R value of 60 for subgrades despite the member firm's draft estimate of around 15, which indicates not so favorable conditions

Abi: And listen, the A firm definitely understood that that was indicating poor conditions because they instructed the member firm just to remove that portion of an estimate from their final report.

Liz: Oh, no.

Abi: It's every angle

Liz: Right? Like, it's just, it's just getting worse. So no select base was provided beneath the asphalt, and guess what? The pavements began failing, and only after intervention did a redesign occur.

Abi: 'Cause you know what I found? Rework is so cheap.[00:14:00] 

Liz: Oh, absolutely.

Abi: OK, and I know that we keep hitting all these critical moments, but there's another one, and it involved the toe drains for the seepage control

Liz: Well, the member firm warned that seepage could threaten embankment stability due to the narrow dikes and proposed toe drains as a mitigation for that.

Abi: And unsurprisingly, the recommendations were initially rejected by both the county and the AE firm.

Liz: Well, we wouldn't have a story without that. So now the member firm is basically forced to take the extraordinary step of threatening to notify the State Department of Dam Safety, stating that they believe that the embankments were unsafe

Abi: It's really unfortunate when you get to that point, honestly. 

Liz: Yeah, it really is.[00:15:00] 

Abi: Thankfully though, when the county and the AE firm heard about this, they did reverse course and implement the member firm's recommendation.

Liz: So that moment really underscores the ethical responsibility that us as geoprofessionals have and how far things can escalate when those early warnings are ignored. I think sometimes we as geoprofessionals forget that responsibility that we have and that sometimes we do need to invoke that, right?

Of, of, hey, you know, you're not listening. There is a real safety concern here, and being willing to take that next step.

Abi: Yes, I agree. I feel like when safety's involved, that's a time to put your foot down, and I know that can be difficult and sometimes even scary with our clients, but this is showing how worth it it really is.

Liz: Agreed

Abi: So, all of these escalations and [00:16:00] warnings are happening, and we get on to our litigation phase.

In total, this project suffered about $8.5 million in damages. It led to lawsuits with the county, the AE firm, the member firm, the subcontractors. Just about anybody who touched that project, they're involved.

Liz: Well, of course, and as litigation goes, it dragged on and on for five and a half years before they settled out of court.

Abi: Goodness. And like I said, we got a lot of dollars going out. So the AE firm, when they settled out of court, agreed to pay 3.75 million, but later had to file for bankruptcy.

Liz: Ooh, ouch. The member firm, despite identifying nearly all issues early and they acted professionally, they [00:17:00] still ended up paying out about $925,000 to settle, and they spent nearly $500,000 just to defend themselves.

Abi: It's so frustrating to read, but it's a powerful reminder. When we're right, it doesn't just protect you from the claims. Like, claims can be made even when you make the correct recommendations.

Liz: Right? You still gotta pay to defend yourself.

Abi: Yes.

Liz: So this case kind of ends with three major lessons. And the first that I wanted to bring up is to trust your gut instincts.

Abi: Absolutely. Especially when budgets are thin, schedules are aggressive, the communication's restricted, and your recommendations are being igno- ignored. These aren't just like subtle warning signs. These are big signs

Liz: Right. Something, you know, hey, do something about, right?

And [00:18:00] if necessary, consider refusing or withdrawing from an engagement. You can do those things professionally and carefully.

Abi: And a lot of times it can still save your reputation even when you have to say no.

Liz: Agree.

Abi: That second big lesson, be wary when geoprofessional services are assigned to or assumed by others.

Liz: Yeah. So designers taking on roles they're not fully equipped or trained or have the experience for, I mean, and then combining that with owners reshuffling responsibilities, it can really lead to a lot of systematic and technical type failures.

Abi: Yes, and that can get scary. And the third, and I sound like a broken record, but it's document everything. If these things are not in writing, they straight up didn't happen.

Liz: Oh, absolutely. You gotta remember it this way, right? That [00:19:00] documentation protects not just your firm, but the integrity of the project itself.

Abi: I agree. So this case history was a tough one, but powerful for sure. I really enjoyed reading it, and I hope our listeners take a second to check out the full case.

Liz: Oh, I agree. It really shows how early technical insight when sidelined can lead to cascading failures, right? Just one thing after the other was happening, and really how communication is just as critical on these projects as the engineering judgment and that technical insight is.

Abi: Exactly. The confidence is definitely key here. Well, thank you all for listening to the GBA podcast today. I hope you're able to take away some useful info that will help you and others at your firm make good risk-based decisions in the future. If this episode resonated with you, we wanna hear your [00:20:00] story.

Email us at info@geoprofessional.org or comment on our LinkedIn posts.